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Foreword
It is my pleasure to present this book Addressing the Problems of Access: Protecting Sources, While Giving Users
Certainty, written by Jorge Cabrera Medaglia and Christian López Silva, which is published as IUCN
Environmental Policy and Law Paper (EPLP) No. 67/1.  This book represents an important contribution to
the body of ABS scholarship currently available, and is provided at a critical time in the development of ABS
as a functional concept.  The IUCN EPLP series dates back to 1972, and has through 35 years maintained a
high standard of legal scholarship and quality outputs.
The ABS Series, which includes this book, is the first “sub-series” within the EPLP series, designed in
this way to maximize the usefulness and accessibility of these writings to the broad range of participants
addressing the ABS challenge at both national and international levels.  We believe that this Series offers a real
contribution that will enable progress on an issue which has, to now, been stymied both by its complexity and
by its controversial nature.  It is only through the understanding of those complexities that consensus and useful
compromise can be attained that will resolve the controversies and enable a functional system for achieving the
all-important equity objective of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
Dr. Alejandro Iza
Director
IUCN Environmental Law Centre
June, 2007

ix
In the course of The ABS Project, IUCN’s Environmental
Law Centre has taken a central position in promoting
researched and balanced analysis of critical components
of the current discussions of the international regime on
access and benefit sharing under the CBD. The ABS
Series provides the culmination of these efforts, enabling
recognized experts to undertake intensive research and
present detailed, balanced and reasonable analysis. It
operates as a counterpoint to the growing numbers of
authors whose work in ABS issues is sometimes more
focused on advocacy than research. With this Series,
we are trying to take a very different approach and to
achieve a very different objective. Simply put, we hope
to provide a deeper understanding of the legal, eco-
nomic, practical and factual issues affecting the debate,
and to build our analyses and recommendations on
intensive legal research.
I have the pleasure of offering this brief introduc-
tory comment, in introduction of the first book in
The ABS Series, by Jorge Cabrera and Christian López:
Addressing the Problems of Access: Protecting Sources,
While Giving Users Certainty. Like all books in the
Series, it presents professionally skilled work from
among the most able and well recognized legal experts
working in the ABS area, in conjunction with rising
experts in the field. In selecting the author, The ABS
Project called on recognized international expert Jorge
Cabrera and invited him to develop a collaborative
team. He selected Christian López Silva, a young 
lawyer who has already gained extensive international
experience in genetic resource issues (ABS and GMOs)
through collaboration with key international law
experts in IUCN, UNU, and the Sheffield Institute of
Biotechnological Law & Ethics. 
This book represents an effort to provide a bal-
anced and researched analysis of the facts and law rel-
evant to the development of national legislation by
which countries provide the authority and rules for
utilization of genetic resources over which they have 
sovereign rights recognized under the Convention on
Biological Diversity. 
This book, and indeed the entire ABS Project,
owe a great debt to our primary financial supporter,
the German Federal Ministry for Economic
Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium
für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung
or BMZ), and especially to Julia Kaiser, Andrea Laux
and Frank Schmiedchen – without whom this work
could not have been completed. Numerous other
partners and collaborators have also made important
and sustaining commitments for which we are very
grateful.
Finally, on behalf of all of the authors of this title,
I express our gratitude for the support and foresight of
Dr. Alejandro Iza and the IUCN Environmental Law
Centre. It was through Dr. Iza’s efforts that The ABS
Project became a reality, and his understanding of the
difficulties in its implementation as well as his 
support and the unstinting assistance of the staff of
the Environmental Law Centre, including especially
Legal Officer Daniel Klein, Project Assistant Ann
DeVoy, Senior Information and Documentation
Officer Anni Lukács, Documentation Officer Andrea
Lesemann and Documentation Assistant Monica
Pacheco-Fabig. Collectively, these individuals have
been a primary reason that the Project could finish its
work and that outputs throughout the term of the
project have achieved the level of legal excellence
expected of the IUCN Environmental Policy and Law
Papers, among which The ABS Series has been included.
Tomme Rosanne Young
Series Editor and Project Manager, The ABS Project
June, 2007
Series Editor's Preface

xi
The ABS Series represents a response to two realities:
First, the ABS issue is controversial, and technically
and legally complex. Because of the constant interna-
tional concern over controversial policy and political
issues, primary focus of all writing on ABS has been
focused on political positions and advocacy, even
where the expressed purpose of a particular document
is “practical legal advice.” Lack of a rigorous body of
ABS analysis has been one part of this implementation
problem. Many professional inputs are characterized
by opinions that are unsupported, or supported only
by citations to the opinions of other experts or random
references to or excerpts from laws and policy instru-
ments, taken out of context. 
To IUCN’s Environmental Law Centre, it has
become clear that the complexity and the controver-
siality are linked problems. Solutions to the interna-
tional ABS controversies are currently stymied by the
lack of credible, non-biased technical analysis of the
elements and issues of national implementation.
Serious in-depth analyses are needed concerning not
only the few ABS examples, but also the kinds of legal
options that are available and the manner in which
they function. Simply put, one cannot build a struc-
ture without the right tools – and having the tools is
meaningless without knowledge of what they can and
cannot do.
The second “reality” faced by this project is the
fact that, despite the long-extending international
negotiations, genetic resources are being taken, 
studied, developed and utilized every day. Countries
do not have the luxury of waiting for international
negotiations to answer their questions, before taking
action. It is consequently urgent for all parties (users,
source countries, source communities and resource
owners, user countries, researchers, middlemen and
others) to have some basis for taking these actions.
More important, they need to have some certainty
that this basis will be robust enough to protect his/its
rights, even after international negotiations provide
some guidance or assistance to all or part of the ABS
issue. Even where national laws and practices exist, 
they are proving inadequate to this objective, in some
measure owing to the lack of technical help, as described
above.
Consequently, The ABS Series focuses on nation-
al implementation and the legal and legislative issues
that must be addressed, rather than advocating or
addressing a particular side or position in the interna-
tional negotiations. Through this process, The ABS
Series seeks to create the best possible basis of
researched information on the practical application
issues. It is thus not only a tool for national decision-
makers but also for implementers. While it is not
always possible to be certain that one has been unbi-
ased, we have made an effort, at minimum, to note
the existence of other credible positions on the issues
discussed, and to give some reasons why these 
positions were not more fully expounded.
As of this writing, the international process for
development of the ABS regime is still ongoing.
While not intended to “influence” that process, The
ABS Series has been designed and written in the hope
that a better knowledge of the realities of ABS will
enable the negotiators to develop the regime as a func-
tional and effective tool of conservation, equity and
international development. As such, we believe that the
books in this Series will continue to be primary works
of scholarship and professional analysis on which the
architects and implementers of the ABS regime will
rely long after the negotiations have concluded. In
addition, it is hoped that the authors in the Series (or
a team of similarly qualified experts) will be engaged
to update relevant books from the Series, when the
time is right.
Target Audiences: Writing for a broad audience
can sometimes be challenging for lawyers. In The ABS
Series, however, we recognize that our primary 
audience includes national decision-makers, NGOs
and others, as well as lawyers and economists. We
have endeavored to present our research in an accessi-
ble way, without doing harm to our absolute standard
of legal correctness. Although many readers would
About the Series
xii
like a “simplified” pamphlet-style analysis of the ABS
issue, which can answer all of their questions in a few
pages, this is not possible – the only simple fact about
ABS is that it is not simple. The ABS Series provides
summaries of the complexities in the issue that legal
specialists must grapple with, but at the same time
attempts to avoid “legalese” and its companion “econo-
ese.” In this way, we feel that The ABS Series provides
both clarity and understandability for the non-lawyer,
who may obtain a thorough grounding in the ABS
issue through reading these books. For the legal or eco-
nomics professional, however, these books also provide
resources and information that will enable their deeper
understanding of ABS issues. 
The future: The ABS issue is still evolving. After
the commencement of The ABS Project, the CBD
entered on a groundbreaking process of re-evaluating
ABS and attempting to develop the necessary tools,
consensus and understanding (e.g., a clearer and more
functional “international ABS regime”) that will
enable progress toward achieving the goals of the
CBD. With this decision, The ABS Project underwent
its first evolution. It had begun as a project aimed at
helping national governments to find some positive
steps to enable them to try to achieve the fixed language
of CBD Article 15. In 2004, it necessarily expanded
that focus – embracing the goal of informing all 
participants and interested persons (at national, region-
al and international level) regarding the options,
instruments, practices and processes that can enable
the ABS regime to become a functional mechanism
for achievement of the CBD third objective. Only
time can decide how far the international negotiations
will go toward assisting and supporting ABS implemen-
tation. The team of professionals who have worked to
provide The ABS Series hope that a useful and innova-
tive result is quickly obtained, and that we will all
have the opportunity to extend the work of this Series
and to guide, analyze and promote the new regime
components that will be developed.
Acronyms
ABS access to genetic resources and benefit sharing
TRIPS WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity 
COP Conference of the Parties to the CBD 
IPR intellectual property rights  
ITPGRFA International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
MAT mutually agreed terms 
PIC prior informed consent 
TK traditional knowledge 
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO World Trade Organization 
xiii

A number of issues are clear. For example, many of the
most significant legal impediments to functional ABS
legislation cannot be solved at the level of a single
country. Some countries have tried to address key 
problems, but found that their solutions cannot be
functional in the absence of generally agreed under-
standing regarding the legal principles underlying
ABS. Other countries, although recognizing options
that could make ABS law effective, have avoided those
options, fearing that any decision to use language or
concepts not found in the CBD could have the effect
of narrowing their rights or legal protections. 
A number of the standard statements about why
ABS is not working appear to be false – for example, in
the negotiations of the Bonn Guidelines, it was consis-
tently stated that overly complex national legislation and
institutional arrangements, and high transaction costs
were the primary factors that prevented companies from
involvement in ABS. There are certainly situations in
which legal problems have gotten in the way of ABS
negotiations. However, preliminary analysis of contracts
and legislation suggests that a country with a very sim-
ple ABS law is no more likely to gain an ABS contract
than one with very complex requirements. Companies'
confidence in the individuals and agencies they are deal-
ing with may be a much more significant factor.
This book is intended to address the "Access" compo-
nent of the Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) legal
analysis, in detail. Specifically, this book does not aim
to provide a comprehensive listing of particular provi-
sions by country,1 or engage in country-by-country
analysis. Rather, it is focused on substantive issues of
Access law, seeking to achieve three divergent objectives: 
• To identify the particular elements of "access"
that must be addressed by each country that is or
may be a source of genetic resources for use in
another country (in the words of Article 15, that
may be a "country providing genetic resources");
• To explain several primary legal concepts (enforce-
ability, the problems of ambiguity and vagueness,
etc.) in a way that is accessible to non-lawyers
(international delegates, legislators, government
officials, and involved civil society groups). Here
the objective is to be very clear about why there are
problems, why they have not been solved by 
existing national approaches, and (possibly) what
might be the options for solving these problems; 
• To use these concepts: 
º to explain why earlier "assumptions" about the
legal process of implementing ABS were incor-
rect; and
º to enable understanding of the nature of the
legal impediments that must be addressed and
the kinds of issues and solutions that can
function legally as tools of ABS implementation. 
Although it cannot exist without its partner – the
"benefit-sharing" component – the access element of
the law of the source country, and the contents of any
"ABS Agreement" negotiated in that country are the
primary legal foundations on which the rest of the
"international regime on ABS" will be built. Hence it is
essential to create a systematic analysis of the require-
ments of that law, both the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) requirements and the basic require-
ments of enforceable legislation, which are often not
considered in analysis of access legislative issues.
1
Introduction1
1.1 Some facts and issues
1 Tables of then-current national ABS legislation were provided in an interim publication under this series – Cabrera Medaglia, 2004, 
A Comparative Analysis. That initial paper, and the tables within it, may be accessed on the IUCN Environmental Law Centre's website at
www.iucn.org/themes/law 
This paper is intended to address the legal issues that
can be appropriately applied in "source country" leg-
islation - the need to, on one hand, properly protect
national interests in genetic resources while, on the
other hand, providing sufficient "user certainty" and
other types of legal (market) confidence, to encourage
users (research and commercial entities) to incur the
time and expense of complying with the "access"4
component of ABS. 
The legal systems for ABS were created without a
clear and consistent understanding of certain critical
Key legal issues that have a significant impact on
enforceability of ABS Agreements are not addressed in
many countries. One such issue relates to the definitions
of "genetic resources," "biological resources" and "utiliza-
tion of genetic resources." If the parties, the judge or other
enforcing person/entity cannot objectively verify whether
a particular transaction involves "genetic resources" or the
"utilization of genetic resources" then the agreement may
well be considered to be "vague" and the court will refuse
to decide any legal issue relating to it. Many countries try
to avoid this problem by writing their law so that ABS
provisions apply to all "biological resources;" however this
only compounds the problem, since under such a law,
every market transaction involving agricultural products
would be an "ABS transaction."
Other key legal issues affecting implementation and
enforcement include: 
• Application of (tangible and intangible) property
law to genetic resources; 
• Clear understanding of the concept of "public
domain" over genetic resources and its legal con-
sequences on the rights transferred to the users;
• Difficulties in drawing the line between com-
mercial and non-commercial ABS projects; 
• Difficulties in obtaining Prior Informed Consent
(PIC);
• Reliance on unenforceable "assurances" regard-
ing what will happen after the resource has left
the country; and
• Lack of incentives for users to affirmatively seek
the relevant permits and agreements.
At least one question has so far not been serious-
ly asked - the ability of the provider country to tie the
access agreement to compliance by the user country.
Specifically, it is clear that "access" provisions are only
half of the required legislation. To be properly covered
by law, each "access" arrangement can involve two
types of legal instrument:
(1) the "access" instruments (laws, agreement, license,
etc.) in the source country, and 
(2) the "measure to secure benefit sharing and com-
pliance with the terms and conditions under
which access was granted."2
Similarly, it is only possible to impose an access
requirement where both provider country and user
country adopt measures requiring it. User countries
undermine the ability to apply ABS, wherever they fail
to adopt legislation requiring the companies and insti-
tutions in their country to enter into access arrange-
ments for every case in which they are using genetic
resources from another country.3
In this regard it is equally important to address the
legal ability of the source country to condition access on
the use of resources only in (or under the jurisdiction of)
countries that have adopted sufficient "user measures."
2
2 In this connection, it is important to remember that, in the CBD, ABS is entirely focused on cross-border situations. Domestic uses of the coun-
try's own genetic resources are not covered. This does not mean that the source country cannot regulate domestic uses, however, only that they
are not directly part of the CBD's requirements.
3 These issues are discussed in Tvedt and Young, 2007.
4 It seems useful to divide the ABS process into “access” and “benefit-sharing.”
1.2 Open issues and concerns
The application and the sufficiency of the contractual
processes as a means of guaranteeing the conditions of
access and the mutually agreed terms, including the
benefit sharing, is still unresolved. In this sense, the
principal instrument that the CBD has considered for
the realization of its Third Objective has been the use
of bilateral mechanisms (contracts).7 Not surprisingly,
a body of literature dealing with "bioprospecting 
Related to the foregoing, the legal consequences of
applying the regime of public domain to genetic
resources, as occurs in some legal systems, especially
with respect to the rights conferred to the user over
the samples (extracts, fractions, etc.) needs to be
addressed.
themes necessary for the systems to be (legally) consistent
and functional. Elements of existing legal frameworks
(contracts law, property rights regimes, etc.) were 
utilized with the idea that they would be applicable
without modification or explanation to transactions
related to genetic resources.
Among the elements and mechanisms utilized
for the construction of ABS systems are:
3
Introduction
5 Cf Caillaux and Ruiz, 2002. In this paper, they affirmed that the access legal framework “must be thoroughly unambiguous with regard the definitions
especially with respect to what is really meant by access. The legal regime that controls access must be also very clearly defined in terms of its scope and
boundaries. (Does it apply to medicinal plants? Does it apply to taxonomic research? Do the same rules apply to nationals and foreigners?) The success
of an access regime will largely depend on these variables.”
6 See regarding the transboundary nature of genetic resources, Aguilar, 2004.
7 A quick analysis of the ABS measures, like the 391 Decision of the Andean Community, the Biodiversity Law of Costa Rica and the Provisional
Measure of Brazil, among others, shows how contracts are an essential instrument for the ABS systems. See Gartforth et al., 2004.
1.2.1 The use of CBD definitions 
In the provisions discussing access, the terms "genetic
resources" and "biological resources" are used as defined
by the Convention without clarifying their scope.
This has made it difficult to clearly determine a key
aspect of the access systems, such as their scope, and
the activities or resources covered by the ABS laws and
regulations.5 
1.2.2 The application of traditional property regimes (over tangible assets) 
to "genetic resources" 
Depending on how "genetic resources" is defined, the
Convention on Biological Diversity can be considered
as the starting point for the creation of a new proper-
ty right (and consequently a right of commercializa-
tion) over these resources. Nevertheless, in contrast to
other natural resources (wood, petroleum, minerals),
the exercise of property rights (including control) over
genetic resources presents difficulties that have not
been adequately considered. The Convention inten-
tionally leaves countries the freedom of determining
their own systems of property rights over genetic
resources, which is correct in terms of the overall 
convention (which consists predominantly of provi-
sions which call for the development of national legis-
lation), but at the same time, the lack of guidance from
the CBD has been an impediment to the development
of legal analysis of whether traditional systems of prop-
erty rights could be applicable to genetic resources. For
example, in Roman-Germanic systems, an essential
aspect of the property right is the ability to exclude
others. Regarding genetic resources, physical control
over the property does not prevent others from the
ability to extract, test or take other actions involving
the genetic resource contained in other existing sam-
ples. Like the shared nature (even among countries) of
the genetic resources themselves,6 this fact presents
questions regarding ownership and dominion.
Likewise, in some countries a distinction has been
made between genetic resources (owned by the State)
and biological resources (owned by private parties)
which contain the genetic resources or components. 
1.2.3 Public domain 
1.2.4 Contractual enforcement 
As conceived in this book, the development of nation-
al ABS regimes has over time displayed the following
characteristics:
1. Legal/legislative development has occurred mostly
in developing countries (that can be qualified as
providers of these resources) considering the 
pioneering experience of the Philippines and the
Andean Community.11
2. The existing regimes were designed without inter-
national guidelines or consensus on how to con-
struct them.12
3. It was thought that the existing legal instruments
(national laws, systems of property, and systems of
contracts) were adequate without modification to
establish operative ABS systems. The understand-
ing of some concepts particular to access to genet-
ic resources has impeded, in some degree, the real-
ization of the objectives of the establishment of the
ABS regimes. The legal instruments that the coun-
tries have utilized to construct ABS systems (such
as contracts, procedures to grant permits for use of
natural resources, etc.) are developed and regulated
under the various national legal systems (i.e., not
under a single unified international system).
contracts" has been developed,8 but little formal or
official legal interpretation (court decisions and other
applications) has actually been generated. At minimum,
the application of contract rights alone can be 
insufficient to protect provider countries or areas,
especially due to the fundamentally transnational
character of the relations of the ABS and the ease of
reproducing genetic information contained in the
samples.
4
8 See for instance, Downes, 1994; Gollin, 2002; Cabrera Medaglia, 2004, “Elementos básicos ...”; Rosenthal, 2003; Sampath, 2005; CBD, 1998.
9 Young, 2006.
10 For instance the bioprospecting initiatives which became public in Mexico, see Larson et al., 2004.
11 On the legislative process in the Philippines, see Benavidez (in Carrizosa), 2004.
12 Later, the CBD adopted the Bonn Guidelines on Access and Benefit Sharing in 2002. See Decision VI/24. However, the Guidelines do not pro-
vide orientation on certain key issues (practical definition of genetic resources; what is utilization, etc.) but have focused on well known con-
cepts like mutually agreed terms, examples of benefit sharing, etc. The Guidelines were based on the previous work of the Expert Panel created
by Decision IV/8 para. 3. Before the Panel was created the CBD activities on ABS were limited to gathering information on national measures,
good practices on ABS, etc.
1.2.5 Reliance on source country law
The creation and application of national laws, and the
established mechanisms of monitoring and control, have
been considered to be sufficient to ensure compliance
with the conditions of the permits and access contracts.
Essentially, however, these laws and compliance
mechanisms base their ability to determine compli-
ance solely on the user's reports regarding his progress,
including indirect reporting (under which the source
country's awareness of these results is obtained by
screening, patent applications, etc.).
1.2.6 Lack of incentive-based approaches 
The regulatory framework and policies of the ABS
have not adequately considered the design of 
incentives to encourage the compliance of users (com-
panies, universities, etc.) with the ABS regulations.
The difficulties of applying traditional concepts of
property, control, and monitoring to genetic resource
uses have not promoted the establishment of incen-
tives for compliance with access procedures, in a way
that would make it "good business" for commercial
and scientific users to follow the rules. As will be men-
tioned later, on occasion, the ABS systems have
appeared to "penalize"9 those who want to follow the
legal procedures.10
1.3 Characteristics of national regime construction
Nevertheless, some existing difficulties for the
effective application of the ABS laws are due to the
lack of understanding (or creating) of what can be
called "legal concepts specific to access to genetic
resources." 
For example, the ABS legislation to date has relatively
easily encompassed, in general terms, the following
aspects: objectives of the system; definitions (from the
CBD); scope of application; competent authorities at
different levels; procedure for obtaining prior informed
consent; procedure for negotiating the mutually agreed
terms (MAT) and the fair and equitable sharing of ben-
efits (using contracts); and requirements that MAT
must include mechanisms for monitoring and control
and sanctions for non-compliance, including penal,
civil, and administrative measures.13
As Young affirms,14 however, "After 12 years 
legislative draftsmen and agencies are still attempting
to grapple with complex legal problems that hinder the
effective ABS implementation. ABS is in some ways
'unique,' particularly in its merger of very new concepts
of commercial law and science with the goals of conser-
vation, sustainable use and equity. New legal concepts
and tools are needed, as well as new uses of existing
tools. Legal innovation, however, is not an easy process."
Equally, it is not possible to address the issue of
legal certainty (for provider entities as well as users)
without considering the difficulties that users (nationals
and foreigners, academics or companies) confront due
to the difficulties of knowing how to obtain the prior
informed consent and to have certainty with respect
to the access procedure.15
Initially, it is important to note a critical point:
Despite their importance, some of the questions that
this study seeks to answer have not been addressed
systematically by the specialized doctrine of the
ABS,16 by the national authorities, or by the decisions
of the Conferences of the Parties, with significant
exceptions.17 These difficulties have not been recog-
nized as obstacles to the effective application of the
access laws, except for some specific studies.18 For
example, studies explaining how to formulate legal
frameworks regulating access, although valuable, 
frequently do not identify the critical elements nor
offer any actual assistance with them.19 There are 
studies of legislation that have addressed some of these
elements,20 but this book will not repeat them.
Rather, it intends to explore conceptual aspects and to
propose workable options. Nevertheless, when neces-
sary, it may refer to provisions that illustrate the afore-
mentioned concepts.21
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13 These basic elements have been suggested by authors like Glowka, 1998; and Mugabe, 1997.
14 Young, 2004, “The International Regime from an implementation perspective...”. 
15 This issue will be addressed later on. With regard to the private sector difficulties in obtaining prior informed consent, see Columbia University,
1999; Ten Kate and Laird, 1999.
16 However, Young has emphasized the importance of addressing these issues, see, among other articles of the author, 2005, “Gaps and
Obstacles...”.
17 See for instance Decision V/26 para. 12 adopted at the V Conference of the Parties, which identified the need for more information on issues
like: incentive measures, clarification of definitions, market for genetic resources, etc. Likewise, see Decision VII/19 adopted at the VII
Conference of the Parties related to the Use of Terms or Definitions (Section A) and the “Measures in User Countries” (Section E). Lastly,
Decision VIII/4 A adopted at the VIII Conference related to property rights on genetic resources.
18 Some limited analysis is presented in Cabrera Medaglia, 2004, A Comparative Analysis. 
19 See Glowka, 1998; Mugabe et al., 1997; Seiler and Dutfield, 2001; Barber et al., 2002.
20 See Cabrera Medaglia, 2004, A Comparative Analysis. See also the study of the Pacific Rim Countries carried out for Carrizosa et al., 2004,
which identifies as a problem for the ABS implementation, among others: “the broad scope of access and benefit sharing policies. Most of them
cover genetic (DNA and RNA), biological (specimens or parts of specimens) and biochemical resources (molecules, combination of molecules
and extracts) found in both in situ and ex situ collections. Monitoring of bioprospecting activities has proven to be a difficult, expensive and
resource-consuming task and no Pacific Rim Country has established a monitoring system,” etc.
21 Among other sources, the author reviewed the following documents or studies: Cabrera Medaglia, 2004, A Comparative Analysis; Gartforth,
2004; Nnadozie et al., 2003; and the ABS measures data base of the CBD www.biodiv.org etc. 
This book seeks to address the most relevant legal
issues to provide certainty for users of genetic
resources and at the same time safeguarding the rights
of the providers. Up to now, the efforts to develop an
international regime of access to genetic resources and
benefit sharing have not addressed this aspect in 
a systematic manner, despite its relevance in terms of
satisfying the necessities behind the negotiations of
the Regime.22
For this reason, the book has been structured in the
following manner:
• In Chapter 2, a basic overview of the primary
approaches to "access legislation" at the national
level is provided; 
• In Chapter 3, this book goes into more depth in
consideration of several principal aspects that are
considered essential for the construction of func-
tional and operative ABS laws, also considering
the concepts of legal certainty and functional
consistency of the access system;
• Chapter 4 addresses the efforts of provider
countries to find ways of enforcing their ABS
laws in the country where the users are located.23
This mechanism is perceived to be of paramount
importance, and the difficulties of monitoring
and compliance (and resulting lack of enforce-
ability) is cited as the reason underlying the call
for a "binding regime" on ABS.
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22 Some authors have suggested the relevance to include these aspects in the work of the ABS Working Group. See Young, 2004, “The International
Regime...;” and Dross and Wolff, 2005.
23 See on the concept of User Measures Decision VII/19 Section E. See also Barber et al., 2003, and Tvedt, “Elements,” 2006. See also Loufi, 2006.
1.4 Purpose and structure of this book
Before turning to the authors' analyses of particular
controversies, it is important to briefly introduce a
few critical objectives of the ABS regime relevant to
the rest of this discussion.
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24 Caillaux and Ruiz, 2002.
25 Caillaux and Ruiz, 2002.
26 For example, even though the scope, methodology, objectives and geographic range of the studies vary, the following documents can be men-
tioned to guide the design of ABS legislation: Glowka et al., 1994; Glowka, 1998; Mugabe et al. (eds) 1997. From other perspectives it is also
possible to mention: Seiler and Dutfield, 2001; Bass and Ruiz (eds), 2000; Swiderska, 2001; Columbia University, 1999; Crucible Group II,
2001; Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, “Case studies...”, 1998; UNEP-WIPO, 2000; and Svarstad, and Dhillion, 2000.
2.1 Construction of access regimes 
Setting the Stage 2
This section provides a basic summary of the compo-
nents of an "access regime" – that is, of those elements
of ABS legislation that are directed at ensuring that
the country is aware of, and able to receive a share of
benefits derived from, the use of genetic resources
from that country. It is based primarily on work pub-
lished by IUCN in an earlier interim publication in
this series – Cabrera Medaglia, J., A Comparative
Analysis of Legislation and Practices on Access to Genetic
Resources and Benefit Sharing (ABS): Critical Aspects for
Implementation and Interpretation. It will not restate
this detailed analysis, but will briefly describe the
components of national access legislation, as consid-
ered there.
Following the Convention's entry into effect,
ABS very quickly became highly controversial,24
beginning with the promulgation of the Philippines
Executive Order in 1995, the first specific legislation
centered on the regulation of ABS. Later, the first
regional framework, Decision 391 "The Common
Regime for Access to Genetic Resources" of the
Andean Community, too was intensively discussed.
Numerous studies, seminars, publications and discus-
sions have been generated on this subject.
Nonetheless, in spite of the time elapsed and of the
accumulated experience, difficulties still continue to
arise in the negotiations at the core of the CBD, and,
what is even more worrying, a series of obstacles per-
sist which impede the effective enforcement and 
implementation of these initiatives and measures.25
To date, numerous different studies and research-
es, on the efforts of promulgating and implementing
legal frameworks on access and benefit sharing at the
national and international levels, have been complet-
ed.26 These studies can be characterized basically
according to their approach to four main issues:
• the design of the laws and regulations; 
• the participation of stakeholders in the national or
regional processes of drafting ABS laws and policies
and, eventually, in the negotiation of contractual
agreements and other arrangements relative to
ABS; 
• contracts, agreements and other arrangements on
ABS; and
• aspects relating to the implementation of the
legal provisions. 
However, even more recent studies, which refer in some
degree to aspects of implementation and interpretation
of ABS regimes in general, lack any legal or institutional
analysis that emphasizes the needs which the regulation
on access to genetic resources imposes on legal systems.
This last has become more imperative, in consideration
of the fact that at least 15 countries have some legislation
on ABS and more than forty are in some phase of design
or are considering introducing new legal rules to regulate
the access to genetic resources and benefit sharing.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the specific ele-
ments of national access legislation, however, it is use-
ful to briefly canvass the primary criticisms that have
been leveled at these laws, generally by the commercial
and academic sectors. At some points in the various
ABS negotiations, these factors have been cited as the
"reasons that ABS is not working." More recently,
however, most writers and negotiators recognize that
these points are less common than formerly stated,
and that they represent only the perspective of users.
Consequently, while interesting, they should be seen
as a list of the concerns of only one side of the negoti-
ations, recognizing that there are generally equal and
opposite concerns expressed by other stakeholders
with an interest in the ABS issue (governments, civil
society, etc.).
[Note: The following comments were derived
originally from a list based on the experience of the
Philippines, under its Executive Order No 247 (EO),
as implemented by the Department Administrative
Order 96,28 two documents which have since been de
facto amended by the newer Wildlife Act.]29
2.1.2.1 Extent of scope and coverage
30
The scope of the access provisions are frequently too
broad due mainly to a vague definition of the term
"bioprospecting" – a newly coined term which is often
informally used, and sometimes legislatively equated
with "access." Objectors noted that the term
"prospecting" means "to explore" or "to look for," but
that the law (in this case the Philippine EO) covers
more than just "looking for," extending to almost all
kinds of collection, research, and utilization of biolog-
ical and genetic resources, including conservation
research that many scientists, academic institutions,
and NGOs undertake and which have nothing to do
It is generally stated that ABS systems must encompass,
in general terms, the following aspects, in the law and
other relevant practices and systems of source countries: 
• objectives of the system; 
• definitions; 
• resources encompassed or scope of application; 
• competent authorities at different levels (includ-
ing the designation of a "national focal point" for
ABS); 
• procedure for obtaining prior informed consent
(PIC); 
• procedure for negotiating the mutually agreed
terms and the fair and equitable sharing of bene-
fits (using contracts); 
• mechanisms for monitoring and control; and 
• sanctions for non-compliance, including penal,
civil and administrative measures.27
As a practical matter, of course, most of these elements
are relatively straightforward legislatively, and do not
require significant guidance: most countries can desig-
nate focal points, apply and/or extend their standard
public participation practices, apply their standard
contract laws (PIC and mutually agreed terms), and
draft sanctions without external aid. The problems for
most countries arise because the basic international
design of the ABS concept is not completed or
expressed in a way that enables practical implementa-
tion. Consequently, this chapter will provide only a
summary of most of the above "elements" – leaving for
later chapters the discussion about the more difficult
problems of the overall ABS structure.
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28 Petit et al., 2001; Benavidez, in Carrizosa, 2002.
29 2001 Wildlife Law, discussed in Benavidez, in Carrizosa, 2002.
30 “Determining the coverage of the EO was from the start the most difficult issue” (Antonio La Viña, cited in Benavidez, in Carrizosa, 2002).
2.1.1 Main objectives of ABS legislation
2.1.2 Frequent criticisms of access legislation to date
with prospecting. While this is entirely true, it is not
legally or practically incorrect – all legislation defines
some key terms, as shorthand ways of specifying the
coverage of the act or particular provisions.
2.1.2.2 Cumbersome application process
The period from filing of the application to final
approval of the agreement is another point of concern.
In the Philippines (one of the more expedited process-
es), it is estimated to require at least five months. For
most local scientists and researchers, the process is
cumbersome, costly, and considered a deterrent to
research, growth and development.
2.1.2.3 Difficulties involving prior informed consent 
The PIC requirement is usually seen by applicants as
administratively tedious, burdensome and a cause of
much delay – for example, the EO specified a 60-day
period before PIC could be certified as complete.
However, it is the cost of securing the PIC certificate
that is the source of most complaints from the 
bioprospectors' point of view. For example, in the
Philippines (as in many other countries), PIC respon-
sibilities are delegated to the individual communities.
Hence, if the research required utilization or collec-
tion of resources from 12 regions of the Philippines,
the collector would have to go to 12 sites to secure 12
PIC certificates. Each community could impose 
different demands, terms and conditions on that
process. Indeed, even the identification of which 
community should give consent is often problematic,
given the range of species and the fact that many
species populations are pelagic or migratory.
2.1.2.4 Complexity of institutional mechanisms
Many of the most well-developed systems involve the
use of an inter-agency body consisting of representatives
of various agencies of the government and other sectors.
This approach is thought to be advantageous because of
the multi-disciplinary nature of the issues relating to
bioprospecting. However, an inter-agency approach has
many inherent problems as well. It is difficult to get a
quorum of the members; resolution or decision-making
takes a long time because of irregular attendance of
members; and coordination between member agencies
is difficult. 
The contrary approach of broadly disseminating
ABS obligations among the various ministries and sec-
tors has become a common alternative, but places users
in a different situation, in which it is difficult or impos-
sible to know which agencies govern a particular appli-
cation. At some points, both approaches are used, mul-
tiplying the administrative complexity. 
At the international level, these concerns have
instigated the requirement that each country desig-
nate an "ABS Focal Point," who could undertake the
regular activities which would not really need the
involvement of the inter-agency committee, and
could serve as a purveyor of information about which
agencies and requirements apply. Ultimately, however,
while most countries have designated ABS focal
points, few such designees have been able to effective-
ly address the above-listed complaints.
2.1.2.5 Contractual expectations and benefit sharing
One of the most common complaints relates to the
level of demand imposed under benefit-sharing leg-
islative requirements. Often particular percentages
may be stated as "generally applicable" components of
the "mutually agreed terms." In some cases, other
kinds of benefit-sharing provisions are often seen as
too demanding, particularly when imposed on
researchers, given the possibility that they will com-
promise the confidentiality of information developed
by these researchers.
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As noted above, in the past there have been criticisms
regarding the lack of clarity of the term "genetic
resource," and especially its implications in determining
the scope of regulations for access to genetic
resources.31 Particularly, the vagueness of the definition
included in the Convention on Biological Diversity
has been debated, which has been criticized for its lack
of precision. In the same way it has not always been
clear when access to genetic resources occurs, in 
opposition to the access to biological resources, nor
when the utilization of genetic resources takes place
and if this constitutes a different phase altogether.
Predominantly, in most of the legislation about access
to genetic resources, even though those terms are
defined, in practice, it has not always been so simple
to establish which activities constitute access to genetic
resources and which access to biological resources. 
It is also difficult to know which mechanisms are
available to the State to find out whether there is
access and utilization.  
2.1.3.1 Definition issues
The Convention on Biological Diversity defines
genetic resources as follows (Art. 2 Use of Terms):
"Genetic material of actual or potential value."
Additionally the Convention defines biological
resources and genetic material, but does not actually
clarify what it means by "access to genetic resources,"
or "utilization of genetic resources." It further states:
"Genetic material" means any material of plant, 
animal or microbial or other origin containing
functional units of heredity. 
"Biological resources" includes genetic resources,
organisms or parts thereof, populations or any other
biotic component of ecosystems with actual or potential
use or value for humanity.
The implications of this definitional uncertainty
in national laws on access have been easily perceived
in practical application. Some requests have been 
presented, either in exclusively taxonomic terms or for
the commercial utilization of biological resources,
without clarifying the status of genetic or biochemical
properties contained in the samples.32 In other cases,
especially in applications dealing with the use of 
medicinal plants, nutraceuticals and botanicals, 
legislation in many countries excludes these entire 
categories from the scope of access, even though they
are important growth sectors at a worldwide level in
the private sector,33 both as whole (biological)
resources and as genetic and biochemical resources.
Sometimes they are included, but only as to entities
and practices at a higher level of industrialization –
another term that is not defined properly.
In general, the available legislation on access
nearly always bases the definition of genetic resources
on the above language from the Convention, with
some modifications that do not alter its essence, or
enable it to be practically applied. Additionally, 
definitions such as "bioprospecting" are often used to
clarify national intention regarding the scope of ABS
legislation. 
One of the most troubling problems for practical
application is the difference between the normal
acquisition of biological resources and "access to genetic
resources." In general, countries do not provide a clear
indication of the difference between "purchase of 
biological resources" (the organic material) and "taking
the genetic material (which is contained in the biological
material)." The difference is typically thought to be
based on intended or declared use: the search for genetic
or biochemical material contained in the biological 
10
31 CBD, First Report of the Expert Panel on ABS, 1999, reported in COP-5, Document UNEP/CBD/COP/5/8/; Ten Kate and Laird, 1999;
Glowka, 1998.
32 Cf. Ruiz, 2000; Osama, 2003; Barber et al., 2002. For instance, according to the amended regulations (2001), of the Sarawak Access, Collection and
Research, collection means “the removal or taking away of biological resources from their natural habitat or any place where they are found, grown,
propagated, kept or stored, but does not include (article 2):  a) the inspection or study, but without removal, of any biological resources at the place
where the same are found, grown, propagated, kept or stored;  b) the making of any graphic or written description or representation of such biolog-
ical resources; or;  c) the taking of any photograph of any biological resources.” The amended regulations excludes a study, experiment, test or exam-
ination, carried out within Sarawak, of biological resources in connection with any educational course or syllabus conducted by an approved institu-
tion which does not or is not intended to lead to development and commercialization of the aforesaid properties, values and qualities.
33 Ten Kate and Laird, 1999; Rosenthal, 2003.
2.1.3 Definitions, scope and exclusions
One critical element of national law that is needed is
to determine and legally acknowledge the difference
between the owners of the land, from which the spec-
imen is collected, the owner of the specimen, and the
owner of the genetic resources. The current complex-
ities of this issue are more completely discussed in
Chapter 3, but the basic issues should be summarized
here for completeness.
The Convention to Biological Diversity does not
define a property right over genetic or biochemical
resources. Its only input on ownership issues is to rec-
ognize the sovereignty of the States over their genetic
resources. This recognition puts genetic resources on
an equal footing with all other kinds of property (tan-
gible and intangible) – specifically, that the rights of
an individual "owner" of any property extend only to
those matters that the national government says he
may own – something that differs from country to
country. Up to now, however, property systems and
constitutions, with few exceptions, have not made ref-
erence to genetic resources. The fact that genetic
resources are usually integrally included in biological
resources (physical samples of a specimen or part) cre-
ates confusion. However, in the same manner, some
legal systems differentiate between property rights in
biological resources and the proprietary rights in
genetic resources.37 Generally, the State is considered
the owner of the genetic resources but the individual
landowner or specimen owner who gives the biologi-
cal resource containing the genetic resource, or
authorizes the entrance to the land where the resource
is located or to the ex-situ collection, is considered the
provider of the biological resource. 
The definition of the property rights is recog-
specimen, for different purposes (basic research, 
bioprospecting, etc). Supposedly, in some countries, the
taking of biological resources must comply with certain
requirements, including the information provided by the
applicant before granting removal. This information
should contain details on the intended use and therefore
if the proposed use implies access to genetic resources,
the competent authority must refer the applicant to the
appropriate legal body in charge of granting access in
order to initiate the legal procedures for access and 
benefit sharing. 
A related question applies to terms such as 
"utilization of genetic resources" and "access to genetic
resources." These terms are of great importance 
practically, and are discussed in more detail in
Chapter 3, and other books of this series.34
2.1.3.2 Precise scope
Questions of definition also affect the scope of access,
of ABS and of the international system being developed
(both informally and formally) for ABS. The
Convention on Biological Diversity in its article 15
refers only to genetic resources, without specifically
using the term biochemical resources. Nevertheless,
since "genetic resources" has no precise definition, one
cannot tell whether the unique biochemical properties
of a specimen are included in that term. In addition,
the scope of Article 15 does not impede a country
from deciding to extend the scope of its procedures of
access to biochemical resources.35 The latter, owing
essentially to the importance which biochemical
resources hold for research and development in 
pharmaceutical industry, would be a substantial
extension to some observers.36
11
Setting the Stage
34 See especially Tvedt and Young, Beyond Access, 2007.
35 This is specifically stated in the Costa Rican Law, for example, while the Philippine EO, Decision 391 of the Andean Community, and many
other laws include both biological and genetic resources. See Cabrera Medaglia, 2002.
36 Ten Kate and Laird, 1999.
37 The United States may be an exception, based on the fact that some national delegates have claimed that the owner of the land is equally the
owner of the genetic resources located on it. This claim is based on national parks however, which are indisputedly the property of the federal
government. Consequently, it does not clarify the question of ownership of specimen vs. sovereignty over genetic resources. See the document
submitted by the Delegation of the United States to the fourth session of the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore. The document is entitled “Access to Genetic Resources Regime of the United States
National Parks.”
2.1.4 Ownership of genetic resources 
One of the most relevant issues in ABS is related to
the potential ability of the State or other provider of
the genetic resource to impose limits on the further
activities that can be developed by the user. These 
limits can (usually) consist of the following: 
a) Prohibition of the use of the resource for purposes
different than the ones requested. This applies in
relation to obtaining the PIC as well as to the
permit or contract of access itself. The Bonn
Guidelines explicitly consider that the prior
informed consent should be based on the specific
With regard to the mechanisms to enable a provider
country to know when utilization takes place, there is
much commonality among national systems, primari-
ly because such mechanisms are illusory. In general,
the country of origin only knows when utilization has
occurred when there is a previous application for
access wherein a mechanism has been established
which informs about the future utilization of the
resource. There is no system for monitoring the uses
which imply access or utilization of the genetic
resources. However, some countries are engaging in
measures to attempt to address this, even if only in
part. In the Philippines, for example, several references
exist to training activities for controlling access to
genetic and biological resources and attempting to
ensure that their export is in compliance with the
access legislation. 
One country, Costa Rica, has attempted to unilat-
erally impose a requirement for a "certificate of legal
provenance" stating that this certificate is a previous
requirement for granting IPR protection to the innova-
tions related to elements of biodiversity.40 Unfortunately,
owing to primary jurisdiction issues, this provision only
applies to those who seek IPR protection under Costa
Rican law, unless Costa Rica is able to bring a claim,
under another country's IPR law, that the IPR appli-
cation is a breach of contract.
nized as one of the most complex issues related to
ABS.38 The sovereignty concept is different from pat-
rimony and from property; the latter is not
approached by the Convention itself, giving each
State the freedom to decide whether the genetic
resources are private or public property. For instance,
in Colombia, according to the sentence dictated by
the C-977 State's Council, "the legal regime of prop-
erty applicable to genetic resources with real or poten-
tial use is the one established for public domain
goods, in generic terms in Decision 391 of the
Commission of the Cartagena Agreement..." it means
that genetic resources are the inalienable, unattach-
able and imprescriptible patrimony of the Nation.39
There are some sources of confusion even here,
however. Decision 391, for example, specifically refers
to the existence of different types of ownership. First
there is a definition of "provider," which acknowledges
providers both of the biological resources and of the
intangible component. As part of the application, an
identification of the provider of the biological or genetic
resources and intangible component is required 
(art. 26 b). This distinction is also envisaged in the
different access contracts: the annex for the intangible
component (art. 35) and the accessory contract for
the provider of the biological resource, the owner of
the biological resource, the land, and the ex-situ con-
servation centre (as owner or custodian of the biolog-
ical resources) (art. 41). According to this article,
accessory contracts are those that are signed in order
to carry out activities connected with the genetic
resource or its by-products, between the applicant and
the owner, possessor or manager of the land where the
biological resource is located, the ex-situ conservation
centre or the owner, possessor or manager of the bio-
logical resource containing the genetic resource.
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40 Articles 71 and 80 of the Biosafety Law.
2.1.5 Mechanisms to control utilization 
2.1.6 Restrictions on access for specific uses and third party transfer 
There was a general view expressed by some legal
authors in the early years following the adoption of
the CBD that ABS is an exchange at the contract level,
wherein access is the provision of genetic resources
and benefit sharing is the payment for them.
Increasingly a large number of experts share the opin-
ion that this is legally incorrect. 
Access refers to the ability to enter, bioprospect
for, collect and/or remove genetic resources; while
benefit sharing is an equitable construct -– the obligation
to fairly and equitably share the benefits arising from
uses for which consent has been granted. While
prior informed consent may be granted initially
for specific use(s), any change of use, including
transfer to third parties, may require a new appli-
cation for prior informed consent. Permitted
uses should be clearly stipulated and further
prior informed consent for changes or unfore-
seen uses should be required (para. 34 on
Specification of Use). 
b) Restrictions for the transfer of the material to
third parties. These restrictions pursue to avoid
the risk that the third party will acquire the 
samples without the proper follow up and
authorization of the State. Such transfer, howev-
er, could be necessary or convenient for different
reasons. It is normal, in many cases, for companies
to transfer materials to third parties under 
subcontracts for specific screening activities and
researches that will be more profitable if 
outsourced than if conducted "in house."41
Under these scenarios, the legislation can opt to
require a pre-authorization for such transfers or
can contractually establish the requirement of
notice of such transfers as a mandatory provision
in Material Transfer Agreements or other 
contractual ABS agreements, to secure the rights
of the provider and facilitate the monitoring of
the transferred materials.
c) Restrictions on the users' ability to obtain (or file
applications for) intellectual property rights over
genetic resources. Options for a restriction or pro-
hibition on IPR filings can range from a total
moratorium (African Union Model Law) up to a
previous authorization (India Biodiversity Law)
or just requiring a previous notification (Bhutan
Biodiversity Act). The important issue is to
enable awareness of the commercial uses being
undertaken and anticipation of the size and
nature of possible benefits (milestone payments,
etc.). 
d) Commitments on the exclusivity of the access
granted to a user. Even though there is little evi-
dence of its use, it should be possible to establish
such commitments. The need to clarify exclusiv-
ity of rights was a main element leading to the
modification of the Western Australia (WA) law
relative to ABS. The WA Conservation Act
amended provides the possibility of certain
exclusivity: according to article 33.6, the
Ministry and the Executive Director may enter
into agreement with another person to grant,
issue or refuse licenses or permits to take or
remove forest products or other flora in a man-
ner that has the effect of conferring on the other
person an exclusive or preferential right to take
or remove forest products or other flora referred
in the agreement. This exclusivity was applied in
the case of the benefit-sharing arrangement
between the Department of Conservation and
Land Management of WA and AMRAD, an
Australian pharmaceutical company. Exclusive
rights were provided to AMRAD for the com-
mercial development of a product derived from a
WA flora.42
In essence, where one or more of these actions is
restricted in the law or permit, the user can undertake
that action only if he first returns to the provider
country and obtains prior informed consent.   
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2.1.7 Legislative interpretation of access and benefit-sharing obligations and their relationship
Two of the most relevant aspects on ABS, that present
larger difficulties, are related to the monitoring of
access and benefit-sharing conditions, and the existing
legal remedies against non-compliance with the 
contract or permit. ABS legislation will always be 
difficult to enforce, due to the nature of genetic
resources, particularly their wide availability and the
ease of dissemination or replication.43
At present, national ABS legislation does not
include adequate monitoring systems. Monitoring
and evaluation of the agreements is in most cases weak
or absent.44 This seems to be one of the main difficulties
of the ABS regimes. To this, the difficulties derived
from the characteristic of genetic resources as informa-
tion, are added.45 This characteristic has brought to
evidence the inconvenience of applying the traditional
monitoring instruments. Probably, as the Expert Panel
on ABS recommended,46 monitoring could be more
effective with the participation of an institution or
local counterpart.47 This system has been considered
by diverse countries (Bhutan, Bolivia, etc). Regardless
of utility of in-country participation, it must be
acknowledged that research and development in their
most advanced phases will normally be carried out
outside the borders of the country of origin. For this
reason, additional mechanisms to warrant the tracking
of the materials, for example identification systems,
must be explored. In the same way, mechanisms to
oblige the users to present periodical reports, including
reports on the applications for patents, together with
the possibility of making audits to verify the compli-
ance, are some of the indicated solutions. In general,
countries do not have systems that allow them to 
practice audits to verify the compliance with the claus-
es stipulated on the contract itself.  
In the individual ABS contracts, however, most
of the countries seem to have given a particular
emphasis to establishing appropriate monitoring 
systems for compliance with the mutually agreed
terms,48 although the effect of this work has not been
to create clear and enforceable mechanisms. There are
significant obstacles that generally prevent the effective
exercise of legal remedies when contractual (MAT) or
legal violations occur, particularly since most viola-
tions occur after the resources have moved from the
provider country to another jurisdiction. 
Here also, the question of penalties is very simple
to insert in legislation,49 but the uncertainty about the
meaning of key terms, as well as the inability to monitor
or become aware of utilization, are a serious limitation
preventing these measures from having any noticeable
impact. 
the utilization of genetic resources. This latter
approach is based on the idea of utilization and means
much more than just "payment" for access, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 3. However in most existing
national ABS laws, including the ones analyzed in the
Comprehensive Analysis, and from the point of view of
the decision-makers, access and benefit sharing are
considering two inextricable elements of the same
process - or at least benefit sharing is always required
in cases of access. Thus, access triggers the benefit shar-
ing, but no law seems to specifically say that no benefit
sharing will be required where the resources were
obtained in other ways. This standard approach consid-
ers access as a first step for the utilization of the resources
and does not separate – conceptually – access and the
sharing of benefits, even if the latter occurs later.
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43 This issue is examined in detail in Ruiz and Lapeña, (eds.) 2007.
44 Columbia University, 1999.
45 Ruiz, 2000; Cabrera Medaglia, 2003.
46 First Report of the Expert Panel on ABS, par. 88.
47 Cf. Bonn Guidelines, par. 56. 
48 Documented in Cabrera Medaglia, 2002.
49 Ibid.
2.1.8 Monitoring and legal remedies 
Another of the criticisms of the ABS regimes is based
on the fact that they attempt to treat the different sec-
tors equally.51 In all the cases, the current national laws
do not seem to recognize the particularities of genetic
resources for food and agriculture. This is expected,
given that the Convention on Biological Diversity
does not distinguish among different categories of
genetic resources whose conservation and sustainable
utilization vary (according to whether they are wild,
domesticated, microbial, etc.).52 The exchange and
appropriation practices of food/agriculture resources
differ, however, in terms of their distribution and
availability, the level of difficulty in reproducing them,
and the existence or non-existence of market mecha-
nisms for their exchange (among other factors).53 In
the same way, these resources can be conserved either
in-situ or ex-situ, with each option presenting techni-
cal, economical and juridical particularities. For exam-
ple, regarding the ex-situ collections, processes have
been developed like the Common Principles of Access
to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing for
Botanical Gardens and Micro-Organism Sustainable
Use and Access Regulation International Code of
Conduct (MOSAICC).
With some exceptions (e.g., Brazil and Bhutan),
there has not been any legislation which differentiates
between the treatment of genetic resources for food
and agriculture and those of other genetic resources.
Differentiated treatment is expected in future legisla-
Another category of provisions that is easily drafted
but nearly impossible to implement is the group of
social and environmental-based restrictions on the
uses to which genetic resources may be put. These
restrictions are specifically authorized in the
Convention, which limits the access requirement by
calling on parties "to facilitate access to genetic
resources for environmentally sound uses ... and not to
impose restrictions that run counter to the objectives
of this Convention" (Article 15.2). Thus, national
laws include provisions calling for decisions that take
into account the criteria of public interest and the pre-
cautionary principle and the objectives of conserva-
tion, sustainability, the avoidance of environmental
harms, and human health. 
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50 Bonn Guidelines, para. 11.a.
51 Correa, 2000.
52 Correa, 2000.
53 Correa, 2000.
2.1.9 Restrictions imposed for environmental purposes
2.1.10 Support for conservation 
Connected to the previous section is the question of
how ABS laws support conservation and sustainable
use objectives. One of the main criticisms of the ABS
laws is that only a tenuous link exists between access
and the conservation of biological diversity. In many
cases this link exists only indirectly in term of technol-
ogy transfer, reporting and submission of ecological
data, etc. The Bonn Guidelines are not categorical
enough about this link, but consider as one of the
main objectives: "to contribute to the conservation
and sustainable use of biological resources."50 At para-
graph 22 (Overall strategy), it provides as well that the
ABS system should be based on an overall access and
benefit-sharing strategy at country or regional level.
This access and benefit-sharing strategy should aim at
the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity and be part of a national biodiversity strate-
gy and action plan to promote the equitable sharing of
benefits. 
One of the most significant factors in ABS-relat-
ed debates at sectoral, national and global levels is the
fact that they spend little or no time addressing envi-
ronmental and social matters, especially questions of
conservation, sustainable use and equity. 
2.2 Different treatment for agricultural genetic resources and ex-situ collections
Finally, the relation between the IPR and access to
genetic resources has been the subject of various analy-
ses and studies and it is still a contentious issue.55 It
has been and continues to be the subject of enormous
volumes of international academic and legal analysis,
which will not be reproduced here. It is important to
note that there are many other aspects to this issue.
For example, as noted above, national legal regimes of
provider countries sometimes seek to develop and
apply mechanisms for securing and supporting the
PIC and MAT by restricting the use of the IPR 
system, for example, by requiring the disclosure or
certificate of origin of the genetic resources utilized in
the claimed invention.56
tion, however, in connection with the implementa-
tion of the Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for
Food and Agriculture (PGRFA) of FAO in each mem-
ber country.  Broader extension of this Treaty's mem-
bership will probably increase the number of situa-
tions in which differentiated treatment is accorded for
some agricultural species, held by some institutions. 
In the same way, existing regulations do not
always respond to all the particularities that ex-situ
collections can present. The convention is very
unclear about the status of genetic resources that are
sampled from biological material collected before the
entry into force of the Convention on Biological
Diversity (December 29, 1993). This ambiguity cou-
pled with the condition of the collections as users and
providers of genetic resources; their nature as interme-
diary entities; the little information available about
most of them; and the conditions on which the prop-
erty or custody of the genetic resources can be trans-
ferred have created serious concerns regarding the
manner in which those collections can be viewed in
national and global ABS regimes.
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54 See Young, Options and processes... 2002, regarding other situations in which commercial entities must obtain multiple permits in order to be
able to engage in a particular activity.
55 See Dutfield, 2000; ICTSD, 2003; Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 2002.
56 As noted above, the possibility of a Global proposal for such a certificate is discussed in detail in Ruiz and Lapeña, expected 2007. See also the
VI Conference of the Parties of the CBD (Decision VI/24) which contains several references to the use of these mechanisms and, in general, to
the role of intellectual property rights in the implementation of access and benefit-sharing arrangements.
2.3 Regulatory complexity: double permissions
As noted above, a common complaint among 
bioprospectors focuses on the complexity of ABS laws,
particularly the need to apply for different permits to
obtain access to the samples and to remove them from
the country. For instance, in many cases, additional per-
mits to obtain biological resources are required by other
institutions without establishing adequate coordinating
mechanisms among the governmental entities to facili-
tate access to genetic resources for sound uses. From a
government perspective, this situation was probably not
intentional, but is the unintended result of adopting
new legislation that regulates a different component
(the genetic) contained in biological resources tradi-
tionally regulated by other laws. In addition, it is not
uncommon in other sectors, in most countries.54
The extent to which additional permits are needed
(beyond the specific rules of "access to genetic resources")
in order to gain access to the biological resource that
contains those resources, has become another important
legislative inquiry. In the event of different permits
being necessary it is important to determine if coordi-
nation mechanisms have been established to avoid
duplication regarding the permits and to prevent
obstacles to the access to the resources for environmentally
sound uses.  One important co-existing requirement
may be the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) or
related instrument. 
2.4 IPR-related issues
2.5 Legal certainty
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57 See Oxley and Bowen, 2006. 
58 See CBD COPVII, Decision VII/19, part E. g.
59 IUCN-Canada, 2005. 
60 The analysis covers: A. Process certainty: 1. Identification and empowerment of CNA. 2. Integration with other levels and processes. 3. Clear
and transparent procedures. B. Scope and Nature of the Grant. 1. Nature of the Right Granted. 2. Clarity on the mutually agreed terms: the
user obligations. 3. Restrictions on transfer and other rights. C. Legitimate expectations and vested rights. 1. Third Party impacts on the ABS
agreements. 2. Claims of non-compliance. 3 Government alteration for other causes and the loss of a vested right.
61 See Australian Government. Department of Environmental Heritage, Genetic Resources Management in the Commonwealth Areas. Sustainable
Access and Benefit Sharing, Canberra, 2005.
Legal certainty is a characteristic sought by the users of
genetic resources.57 This concern, as expressed by the
users of genetic resources, is based on the lack of clear
regulations regarding ABS in the country of origin of
these resources and associated traditional knowledge,
e.g., developing countries. As a response to this diffi-
culty, the Conference of the Parties to the CBD has
requested an analysis of the theme.58 
In response to this request, a comprehensive study
on "legal certainty" was presented in the III meeting of
the ABS Working Group in Granada, Spain.59
In accordance with the Report, "a party would
have legal certainty regarding an instrument if he was
fully aware of all relevant laws and certain that they
were consistently and predictably in force and
enforceable. A narrow definition of legal certainty for
users focuses on three elements:
• Process certainty: including the establishment and
empowerment of competent national authorities,
specifying rights and duties of others who may be
involved; clarity regarding the procedures for
applying for ABS rights; clarity regarding various
deadlines for processing applications; and clarity
regarding the appeal of the decision by the appli-
cant or by others.
• Scope and nature of the grant: this factor enhances
legal certainty by clearly defining the rights
granted as well as enunciating the mandatory
provisions and conditions that must be included
within the mutually agreed terms.
• Legitimate expectations and vested rights: this kind
of legal certainty can be supported in several ways,
including clear and specific statutory require-
ments and limitations regarding subsequent
challenges to the user activities after receiving
ABS rights and clear limitation of the nature of
government power to alter, cancel, repudiate,
amend or suspend an ABS right, once it has
been received."60
The relevance of legal certainty is evident in the 
position of some countries. For example, the government
of Australia has indicated that one of the advantages of
investing in bioprospecting in Australia is the existence of
legal certainty under the Australian ABS legislation. This
is reflected in the legal regime of that country, by the
adoption of clear and transparent regulations for the
granting of permits, based on a stable system of 
commercial transactions and property rights (intellec-
tual and physical).61
Certainly, legal impediments and obstacles exist that
explain the limited implementation of ABS systems.
Often, for example, countries may have assumed -
incorrectly - that legal mechanisms and institutions 
currently functional for conventional contracts and/or
property transactions would operate in the case of
transactions involving genetic resources without the
necessity for adjustments or modifications. At the same
time, there are other reasons behind the low implemen-
tation of ABS measures, which are no less important.
These include both legal gaps62 and other problems
(e.g., lack of awareness and misunderstanding).63
For example, one critical factor is the lack of
capacity, knowledge, and skills to negotiate the complex
terms of the bioprospecting contracts. The author has
had the opportunity to confirm that this is an element
as relevant as the functional difficulties previously men-
tioned.64 These are related to the issue of the potential
liability of the Governmental Officers in charge of
granting permits or negotiating ABS agreements, if a
mistake is made during the process of negotiation.
Another key problem arises from frustration in
source countries, due to the limited economic and 
non-economic benefits (monetary and non-monetary)
perceived to be derived from the different bioprospecting
projects and, in general, from the application of ABS
frameworks.65 Richness in biodiversity terms does not
necessarily translate into commercial products such as
new medicines, seeds, etc. In this sense, those who have
asserted that bioprospecting would become a "green
gold mine" have had to modify or moderate their
observations. From this perspective, bioprospecting is a
component of a more extensive strategy for the conser-
vation and sustainable use of biodiversity, rather than
the solution to immediate conservation needs.  
Cases of illegal access, misappropriation or
"biopiracy" that have occurred in countries and com-
munities, especially in Latin America, Asia and Africa,
have had frustrating, or even controversial results, sug-
gesting a higher than expected level of difficulties in
finding cost-effective legal solutions within the frame-
work of national ABS legislation or in the context of
industrial property law.66 Emblematic cases such as
Maca in Peru or Neem in India, among many others,
have frequently been mentioned as a rationale for
undertaking modifications to the text or operation of
intellectual property right systems (particularly
patents, which are frequent causes of complaints being
filed for misappropriation or biopiracy). 
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62 See those indicated by Carrizosa et al., 2004; and Nnadozie et al., 2003. See also SCBD, “An Analysis ... including identification of Gaps,” 2004. 
63 Another author identifies five often closely related problems for implementing ABS laws: (i) misunderstandings with regard to the definition of
“genetic resources,” “sovereignty and benefit sharing,” and “IPR;” (ii) lack of awareness of objectives and purposes of the ABS; (iii) failure to dis-
tinguish between sectors and the adoption of the relatively homogenised approach provided by the CBD framework; (iv) lack of information
creating protectionist reactions; (v) dispersed capacity and lack of coordination; see Lettington, 2004. 
64 The CBD has recognized this problem and has developed a Capacity Building Plan adopted by the VI Conferences of the Parties. For ongoing
ABS capacity building projects see Gartforth et al., op. cit., and the CBD web site on capacity building initiatives.
65 The implementation of ABS regulations, and even the existence of concrete initiatives on bioprospecting, has not generated the huge benefits
some had expected for the provider countries and the communities or indigenous peoples. Cfr Cabrera Medaglia, 2004, A Comparative Analysis
and Cabrera Medaglia, “Biodiversity Prospecting in Practice,” 2004. About the commercial value of biodiversity for the different industries and
activities (not only using genetic resources but also biological resources) see Ten Kate and Laird, 1999. On the potential commercial value of
genetic resources – especially from microorganisms – for the pharmaceutical industry, see Suzuki, 2005.
66 It is difficult to quantify the level of these activities due to the lack of legal certainty on the definition of biopiracy. For some, it consists of the acqui-
sition of genetic resources and traditional knowledge without the consent of the country or holder of the resource or knowledge; when rules for fair
and equitable benefit sharing are not established; when IPR protects innovations that are copies or cosmetic modifications of the genetic resources;
or when IPR protects biotechnological innovations based on the genetic resources, whether or not prior informed consent exists, etc. On the topic
of biopiracy and the difficulties of judging whether certain activities constitute misappropriation. Cfr, Dutfield, 2004; and Young, 2006. 
2.6.1 General considerations
2.6 Functionality and consistency in the ABS legal frameworks
This part briefly outlines some legal aspects that
should be carefully established in national and inter-
national systems, with the purpose of ensuring that
the regimes of access can function adequately.
In addition, although the CBD requires the Parties
to take measures to ensure fair and equitable benefit
sharing (see particularly the provisions of article 15.7), it
has mostly been developing countries that have issued
regulations on ABS.67 Thus, the nations that are home
to pharmaceutical, biotechnological and agricultural
companies (mostly developed countries) have not effec-
tuated the corresponding regulations to ensure benefit
sharing - which are necessary if they are going to com-
ply with their legally binding international obligations.
The absence or limited presence of so-called "user coun-
try measures" has been criticized as one of the causes of
high transaction costs and the highly controlling nature
of current access laws. The need for "user country meas-
ures"68 has been stressed by those who have noted the
transboundary nature of ABS in trade relations69 and
the inadequacy of national regulations after the samples
or information on the genetic resources leave the coun-
try that provided them. In this context, it can be stated
that the ABS provisions in the countries of origin are
incapable alone of creating an ABS system that is func-
tional and consistent.
One of the common denominators of ABS is the
lack of trust among the different actors involved or
potentially involved in ABS transactions.70 This
atmosphere is not appropriate to advancing negotia-
tions, whether internationally, among countries, or in
a more limited way, through contracts between
providers and users of genetic resources.
2.6.2 Functionality and consistency of ABS systems
At the same time, some of the functionality difficulties
mentioned by lead authors in this field are as follows:71
"Functionality is needed in any legal framework. It
depends on the law maker's ability to weave laws,
regulations, contracts, permits, institutions into a system
satisfying five basic legal systematic requirements:
• legal consistency,
• clarity about what is forbidden, permitted, encou-
raged and or mandatory,
• mechanisms that protect and give legal certainty
to all parties,
• practically implementable enforcement mecha-
nisms, and
• consistency related laws, frameworks, systems and
tools.
Regarding ABS, the Convention itself has hindered
the creation of sufficient clarity, consistency and
replicability."
A recent paper on ABS functionality (developed
under the ABS project) cites the following "elements
to facilitate ABS implementation through consisten-
cy, legal certainty and clarity:"
• Certainty about what transactions and uses are cov-
ered by ABS: Knowing which transactions involve
"genetic resources" (GR) requiring compliance
with ABS laws and which are biological resources
(utilizing conventional markets and instru-
ments);
• An effective legal means by which each source coun-
try can know of and protect its rights after genetic
resources leave the country;
• Accepted indicators that can be used to "prove"
that GR used in one country have come from a
different country and that the user has obtained
a valid right to use them;
• Key messages clarifying the meaning of GR and use:
CBD negotiations opted not to negotiate clear
provisions about what genetic resources are and
how they are owned or transferred, leaving the
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67 Cfr, the study by Gartforth et al., who describe current ABS measures and legislation. According to this study, approximately 25 countries have
some kind of specific legislation on ABS. In many cases, however, the ABS elements of the laws identified include only general statements whose
effective application requires additional regulations or laws to further develop the general precepts.
68 Cfr Barber et al., 2003.
69 Young, 2005; Cfr Young, “Genetic Resources ...,” 2004.
70 IISD, Stratos, and Cabrera, A Guide... , 2005.
71 See Young, “Gaps and Obstacles...”, 2004.
clarification of these matters to national law.
Negotiators left countries unguided;
• Operative clarity: Consistent understanding is the
first issue here as well. Users-providers-agencies
must know objectively if a genetic or biological
resource or use of genetic resources is involved;
• Procedures for obtaining ABS permissions: Most
countries' national legislation already contains
procedural systems that can be models for PIC
and MAT related procedures in ABS. National
experience is the first and best guide to applying
and implementing these requirements in its gov-
ernmental, legal, cultural system; 
• Remedies and controls relevant to ABS compliance:
There are fewer existing mechanisms as tem-
plates for ABS remedies in light of ambiguity of
certain key concepts. With objective ABS stan-
dards, it could be possible to use existing tools
for ABS compliance;
• Legal assurance: The system must provide certain
protections for the Parties involved, including
governments, applicants, property owners, mid-
dlemen, subsequent transferees, user institutions
and other affected parties. This type of legal
assurance is promoted where the legal framework
clearly and objectively defines and protects the
rights that the provider and user acquire by com-
plying with the system;
• User protection: This component of legal assur-
ance appears to require: 
a) a clear distinction of the rights granted in the
ABS agreement, the limits of those rights and
the responsibilities associated to them; 
b) assurance about how and when an ABS agree-
ment becomes final;
• Provider protection: This component appears to
depend on: 
a) the ability to monitor the user or to have cer-
tainty regarding post-access uses of the GR; 
b) clear contractual statement of the source
rights if the user violates; 
c) access to legal processes and incentive mecha-
nisms where the resources are used;
• Enforceability: Some of the challenges can be met
through the regime negotiations, by the adop-
tion of: 
a) enforcement measures that deter both local and
international parties from violating the law;
b) mechanisms for source countries to obtain
jurisdiction over users and or access to justice
in user countries; 
c) accepted evidentiary requirements enabling
source country officials to make their cases
successful in user countries.
• Enforcement addressing two different kinds of actors: 
º the user under an ABS agreement that is accu-
sed of violating that Agreement; and 
º the biopirate who takes GR for commercial
development without any ABS compliance. 
Many enforceability issues will only be raised after
the GR leave the source country. Current ABS
monitoring seems to rely on reports from the user,
raising the question of how does the country con-
firm reports?
• Integration with other relevant laws and processes. In
this regard ABS presents interesting challenges,
including their relationship with the following:
laws on the marketing, purchase, sale, transport,
and use of biological resources; the biosafety frame-
work; protection of plant varieties, germplasm,
food security, forest, etc.; the protection of local
communities; national laws relating to ownership
of and transactions involving tangible and intangi-
ble property; consumer protection and fairness in
contractual/business negotiations and operations.72
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72 This issue is not addressed in this book. In this regard, however, Cabrera Medaglia mentions the complaints – from a bioprospector’s point of
view – about the complexity of ABS laws related to the need to apply for different permits to obtain access to the samples. For instance, addi-
tional permits to obtain biological resources are required by other institutions without establishing adequate coordinating mechanisms among
the governmental entities to facilitate access to genetic resources for sound uses. From a government perspective, this situation was likely not
intentionally created, but it is the unintended result of adopting new legislation that regulates a different component (the genetic) contained in 
• Incentives: It can be difficult to find ways to
enhance the motivation of users, source countries
and others to comply with the system. Few incen-
tives that are offered as mechanisms for promoting
ABS meet these tests. The public relations benefits
of ABS compliance are limited by the fact that few
members of the public have even heard of ABS.
Patent and other legal rights systems are currently
interpreted in a way that does not allow the
issuance of patents to require disclosure of origin or
permission from the source country. The advan-
tages of a good relationship with source countries,
although certainly important, may be less valuable
after the user takes genetic resources out of that
country. There is no current indication that com-
pliance with ABS will protect against future law-
suits or make other legal processes easier. Currently
the market incentives in the ABS as actually imple-
mented are not clear or compelling.73
Following this line of argumentation it has been sug-
gested that74 primary national implementation needs
must be addressed if ABS and genetic resources sys-
tems are to function effectively. As such, the primary
gaps in the framework above appear in the following
categories: 
• Recognition that ABS as transboundary com-
mercial law cannot be implemented effectively
by the source country alone and must be realized
in user countries as well. Without user country
measures, the efforts of source countries to uni-
laterally control and regulate the full range of an
ABS transaction, which is by definition a trans-
boundary transaction, are almost meaningless. ...
One of the most critical gaps in the implementa-
tion of Article 15 is user countries' near complete
failure to provide a similar level of detail of guid-
ance for user country obligations.
• An integrated set of consistent legal concepts,
terms and mechanisms. The only operative pro-
visions of ABS create a new kind of property and
call for a commercially oriented legal framework
to oversee its equitable utilization. The CBD
draftsmen, however, seem not to be aware of how
unique these proposals were. They assume that
existing national property and contract law sys-
tems would be able to regulate and implement
ABS. As a result of this assumption, the legal
parameters of an entirely novel legal right to uti-
lize genetic resources were never specifically
agreed. Even the most basic concepts such as the
meaning of "genetic resources" and "utilization
of genetic resources" are not concretely under-
stood and legally settled. 
• Real and sufficient practical incentives to moti-
vate both countries and companies to create and
utilize ABS systems. Current approaches to cre-
ating a functional ABS must be reoriented to
provide commercial encouragements for compli-
ance rather than seeking to compel compliance
through lawsuits and policing.
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biological resources traditionally regulated by other laws. For that reason, a major difficulty for securing the legality of access is reflected in the
existence of legal frameworks that regulate and control, from different perspectives, the access to or research on biological resources. That is, to
which extent additionally to the rules of access to genetic resources, to access the biological resource (containing the genetic resources) addition-
al permits are required. In the event of different permits being necessary it is important to determine if coordination mechanisms have been
established to avoid duplicity regarding the permits and to prevent obstacles to the access to the resources for environmentally sound uses,
Cabrera Medaglia, 2004, A Comparative Analysis... .
73 See Young, 2004, “Gaps and Obstacles...”.
74 Young, 2004, “Gaps and Obstacles...”. 
Finally, it is convenient to present the status of imple-
mentation of access legislation.75 Although there is a
lack of fact development and analytic studies on this
question, the state of implementation has been con-
sidered low and incomplete.76 Normand77 offers the
following description:
... countries are at different levels of implementation
of access and benefit sharing and have adopted 
different approaches to regulating access and benefit
sharing, reflecting their national administrative
structures, priorities, cultural and social specificities.
While certain Countries have only adopted one
measure, generally legislation, others have adopted a
package of measures, including for example, a
national strategy, legislation or regulations or guide-
lines. A number of countries are still in the process of
developing their national systems and therefore the
package is often incomplete. In addition, the national
procedures and structures are diverse. For example
some Countries have different levels of government
responsible for regulating ABS – at the national/
federal or at the state/provincial level. 
A majority of Countries, with national measures
included on the CBD database can be divided into
three categories: The first category includes Countries
which refer to ABS in their national biodiversity strat-
egy or their environmental or biodiversity legislation
but have not yet regulated ABS in any detail. These
measures generally provide for the developing of ABS
regulations and include some general specifications
regarding elements to be addressed. The second category
includes Countries that have a biodiversity or environ-
mental law with some general provisions on ABS or
access to biological resources, which may include a pro-
vision for the establishment of a regulation on ABS. The
third category is those which have addressed ABS in
greater detail. They have established competent nation-
al authorities, procedures for prior informed consent,
procedures for the development of mutually agreed
terms, including benefit sharing and compliance meas-
ures. The issue of IPR is also generally addressed in var-
ious manners and in varying degrees of detail. 
With regard to the main features of their ABS
regimes, the provisions vary from one national system
to another, although some general underlying ele-
ments may be highlighted:
• Competent National Authorities: in some cases 
the Competent National Authority is an organiza-
tion already in existence, while in other cases a new
organization is created by the ABS measure.
• Prior Informed Consent: In each Country some
type of application for access has to be made in order
to obtain access to genetic resources. These provisions
also provide indications regarding specific informa-
tion that the application should contain and the pro-
cedure leading to the approval or refusal. The major-
ity of measures also require the PIC of the relevant
authority/resource provider in the geographical area
where the GR are to be accessed. Specificities of some
measures include different requirements for access
depending on the type of applicant and different
requirements depending on whether access is granted
for commercial and or non-commercial purposes.
• Mutually Agreed Terms: a majority of existing
national systems provide that mutually agreed terms
are to be set out in an agreement. Some measures also
provide for different types of agreements depending
on whether the genetic resources are being accessed
for research or commercial purposes. The measures
generally provide that the agreement is also to be
approved by the National Competent Authority.
Measures generally provide for BS with the compe-
tent authority or with indigenous peoples and local
communities or resources provider and in most cases
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75 An overview on the implementation of ABS measures is found in Gartforth, 2004. 
76 Furthermore, experience of and documentation on such implementation is scarce. The information available indicates that the development of
national measures has proven difficult for many countries due to a number of factors including a lack of technical expertise, budgetary con-
straints, weak government structures, and political support, local social conflict and conflict over ownership of genetic resources, see CBD, 2004. 
77 Normand, 2004.
2.7 Brief reflections on the implementation of ABS laws
ABS addresses IPR to varying degrees. A number
of measures in the context of benefit sharing include
specific requirements for disclosure of origin of genet-
ic resources and traditional knowledge in IPR applica-
tions. Some countries have specific measures relating
to consultations between national ABS authorities and
national patent offices as well as the ex post facto review
of IPR. Some developed countries have developed and
revised their IPR law to accommodate a disclosure-of-
origin provision, with some differences in scope (dis-
closure of origin only, or also evidence of prior
informed consent).  The issue of sanctions for non-
compliance lies outside the patent law. 
for both. Indications regarding the types of benefits to
be shared vary depending on the measures.
• Compliance measures: the measures examined 
generally include provisions for compliance.
Although few address monitoring and enforcement
to ensure compliance with ABS measures, they 
generally provide penalties, sanctions for infractions
or offences, such as infractions to the provisions of the
legislation, regulation or guideline. These sanctions
include fines, seizure of samples, revocation and 
cancellation of the permission to access, revocation of
the agreement, a ban on future bioprospecting and
imprisonment.78
She concludes: "Developments are currently taking
place in a number of countries, through national ini-
tiatives and capacity building projects, however there
is still a lack of relevant awareness and capacity to
address access and benefit sharing among relevant
actors, in both developed and developing Countries."
Ogolla adds to this description,79 noting that "Most
measures require that a standard clause be incorporat-
ed in the contract. Some legislative measures appear to
focus on non-monetary benefits such as the involve-
ment of local institutions for research and develop-
ment."
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Type of mechanism Specific application
Contract law Provides the means by which the mutually agreed terms are estab-
lished, and the possible use of contractual mechanisms to resolve dis-
putes. Contracts with terms concerning tracking and monitoring of
uses of genetic resources based on reporting obligations.
Law of tangible and 
intangible property rights 
Direct application of property rights concepts, conventionally used for
other types of property, to genetic resource transactions.
Permit-based 
administrative law
Systems for the granting of prior informed consent, requiring provi-
sion of information (to the competent authority) before an authoriza-
tion is granted, and oversight of compliance (legal authority often lim-
ited to activities within the source country).
78 Normand, 2004.
79 Ogolla, 2005.
Table 1. Conventional legal mechanisms currently applicable to ABS systems
In this regard, a study carried out in 2004 has
found that80 relatively few cases exist in which a court
or other official provided an interpretation/implemen-
tation of the regulations. In many cases, the interpre-
tation/implementation can be deduced out of the
omissions made by the authorities, for example, when
considering whether an activity constitutes access or
not. Nonetheless, leaving interpretation to be inferred
from conduct can ultimately generate problems
regarding the control and monitoring of those activities
involving access to genetic resources. 
On occasion, in spite of the existence of applica-
tions for access and (sometimes) access contracts or
permits, it is difficult to establish which systematic
interpretation the authorities have utilized.  It is a
difficult and uncertain task, when starting from the
few experiences available, to arrive at general conclu-
sions. In some countries there are only one or two
documented cases of access through the course of
many years. Even in these cases, from the analysis of the
permits granted, it is not possible to draw conclusions
of interest due to the fact that these are limited to
applying the legal framework without making any
interpretations on important aspects. 
The available information on ABS applications
or ABS contracts is not always public or readily acces-
sible.  There have been cases in which the access to the
genetic resources is granted using general legislation
enabling the grant of research or collection permits
(under general laws on conservation of nature, forests,
wildlife or the environment in general). In such
circumstances, even if the bioprospecting agreements
that are eventually adopted address access criteria and
sharing of benefits, they generally have been negotiated
and accomplished without considering a legal regime
of access, suggesting that formal legal efforts to imple-
ment them may be difficult or impossible.81
The different studies carried out on the imple-
mentation of national ABS laws82 confirm the 
difficulties that are faced by provider countries in
seeking to obtain or verify adequate compliance with
the current legislation of the provider countries. In
practice, the level of enforcement of these laws is 
relatively low.83 There are many possible causes of this.
For example, agencies may have limited negotiating
power to deal with applications, particularly those
involving transnational companies. Often there is also
significant opposition from sectors of civil society that
consider many kinds of bioprospecting initiatives to be
per se biopiracy. Most important may be the absence of
detailed regulations on procedures to facilitate decision-
making by government officials (and give them confi-
dence that they are meeting the responsibilities of
their office). At the same time, it has been observed
that existing ABS procedures are highly bureaucratic
and based more on the premise of control84 than on
promotion. This situation is probably caused, at least
in part, by the need to control the flow of resources,
due to the inadequacy of national regulations for
monitoring the use of genetic resources, as well as to
the lack of user country measures. This has generated
a situation of legal uncertainty concerning access to
genetic resources. 
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80 Cabrera Medaglia, 2004, A Comparative Analysis. 
81 A 2002 study carried out on the Pacific Rim Countries (42 countries) concluded that since 1992, 29 access projects have been approved in that
region under ABS laws (Carrizosa, pers. comm.). Carrizosa concludes that “More than other natural resource policy, ABS has been the target of
misconceptions, politics and negative publicity. Biopiracy claims, poorly defined ownership rights over genetic resources, the patenting of life,
the protection of traditional knowledge and equity issues have thwarted access initiatives and have also contributed to the cancellation of bio-
prospecting projects.” Carrizosa, 2004.
82 See, in particular, Cabrera Medaglia, A Comparative Analysis, 2004; Gartforth et al., 2004; Carrizosa, 2004. 
83 Nevertheless, some improvements are starting to be seen in the application of the legal ABS frameworks, such as in Brazil, for example, where
the number of permits has grown steadily in the last few years, mostly having to do with non-commercial applications. For example, in 2005
there were almost 100 access applications for basic research and 20 for bioprospecting and technological development. See www.mma/port/cgen 
84 Cfr Barber et al., 2002. They suggest that there are only two approaches to be taken into account in building and applying the ABS regulatory
frameworks: (i) controlling access through extremely restrictive legal provisions; and (ii) seeking to facilitate or promote access through flexible
regulations that are more coherent with the user’s reality. 
Despite the foregoing, some countries have been
able to apply the legislation - at least in a limited
form. This is the case in Costa Rica,85 in the system
being visualized and operationalized in countries such
as Brazil86 and in others to a lesser extent. 87
In summary, as one commentator concludes:88
Despite the apparent clarity of the objectives, the
record of implementation is very poor. A growing,
but still limited, number of Countries have passed
legislation and those that have done so are finding it
difficult to implement, only a limited number of
contracts has been approved under new legislation.
...This situation is due to the lack of recognition of
the need of an integrated regulatory approach in
which both provider and users of genetic resources
take action to enforce provisions of the CBD. This
situation was in fact created by a limited recognition
of the realities of biotechnological research and deve-
lopment as well as the lack of coordination mecha-
nisms across jurisdiction. ...Some form of documen-
tation of the genetic resources such as the certificate
of origin, could play [a role] in fostering the CBD
objectives in an economically and efficient manner.
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85 See Cabrera Medaglia, 2004, “Costa Rica: legal framework and public policy.”
86 See presentation of the Brazilian experience made at the COP VIII in Curitiba, “Implementación de la legislación de acceso y distribución de
beneficios en Brasil,” Ministerio de Ambiente, March 2006. 
87 Some developments have taken place in Malaysia ( Sarawak) and in Venezuela. See Cabrera Medaglia, 2004, A Comparative Analysis...,; and
Febres, 2003.
88 Fernández, 2005.

This section seeks, by means of an integrated focus on
the concepts "genetic resource," "derivative" and "
utilization of genetic resources" to suggest some rec-
ommendations that would permit: 
a) improvement of the legal certainty for the applicant for
access and the successive acquirers (which would
allow the granting of certain protection against
claims of misappropriation of genetic resources); and
b) improvement of the rights of the provider by put-
ting legal mechanisms in place that can control the
phase of utilization of the genetic resources.
One of the main problems in the establishment of
ABS regimes derives from the lack of clarification of
three key aspects which can be referred to as 
"conceptual aspects of the ABS." These conceptual ele-
ments cannot be analyzed separately because it is neces-
sary to be clear on each one of them and on the manner
in which they interact and complement each other to
allow the operation of functional ABS systems.
Generally, the majority of countries with ABS leg-
islation have focused on regulating access to genetic
resources, based on the definitions contained in the
CBD.89 Nevertheless, the direct use of this terminology
from international instruments in national laws pres-
ents practical difficulties that impede legal certainty
with respect to the scope of the ABS systems. In many
cases, these definitions have been adopted without con-
sideration of the implications of these concepts.
Additionally, as was mentioned earlier, there are
practically no decisions of the COP90 that call for this
clarification. Some recent studies of the implementation
of access laws mention, as one of the problems with the
efficiency of this legislation, the confusion with respect
to the activities regulated. As examples, it has been
pointed out:
The scope of most ABS policies covers non-human
genetic, biological and biochemical resources found
in ex situ and in situ conditions. This broad scope
This chapter presents some of the most relevant legal
concepts of access, whose proper interpretation/clari-
fication/application is necessary for constructing
functional and operative ABS systems.
The elements that have been considered particu-
larly relevant are the following:
• Conceptual notions: genetic resources, biological
resources, utilization, derivatives.
• Systems of property rights and their application to
genetic resources: implications of the concepts of
public property (public domain) over the 
functionality of ABS regimes.
• Distinction between basic research and commercial
purposes, including the consequences of this dis-
tinction on legal certainty and the rights of the
provider.
• Processes for obtaining Prior Informed Consent.
• Incentives to motivate compliance.
• Monitoring of (i) the flow of genetic resources
and (ii) compliance with the conditions of
access, noting the insufficiency of contractual
provisions to ensure the monitoring of the use of
genetic resources in processes of research and
development carried out in foreign jurisdictions.
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89 Cf. Gartforth et al., 2004; Cabrera Medaglia, 2004, A Comparative Analysis....
90 Decision V/26 had indicated the need for gathering more information on definitions. The Executive Secretary convened an Expert Group on
the Use of Terms, which limited its work to exchanging information about national practices. Decision VI/ 24 requests the ABS Working Group
to study, among others, the use of Terms and Definitions. Finally, Decision VII/19 B invites Parties, organizations and stakeholders to submit
information on the following terms: access to genetic resources, commercialization; derivatives, etc. It also requests the Working Group to con-
tinue working on the use of terms not defined by the CBD. 
Key Issues for Functional and Operative
Certainty in Access Regimes3
3.1 The conceptual aspects 
In the past there have been criticisms of the lack of clarity
of the term "genetic resource," and specially its implica-
tions in determining the scope of regulations for access to
genetic resources.97
Particularly, the vagueness of the definition included
in the Convention on Biological Diversity has been
debated, which has been criticized for its lack of precision.
In the same way it has not always been clear when access
to genetic resources occurs, in opposition to access to 
biological resources, nor when the utilization of genetic
resources takes place and if this constitutes a different
phase altogether. Predominantly, in most legislation
addressing access to genetic resources, even though those
terms are defined, they have continued to be unclear
in practice. In particular, even with statutory adoption
of these definitions, it is not simple to establish which
activities constitute "access to genetic resources" and
which are "access to biological resources." Few States'
ABS laws provide the mechanisms to determine
whether their genetic resources have been accessed
and/or utilized.
As noted in Chapter 2, neither the Convention
nor national law have provided usable practical defini-
tions of key terms. Even those terms which are defined
in the Convention are not defined in a way that
enables implementation. Thus concepts like "genetic
has caused confusion among users and providers of
genetic resources about the type of activities that
should be regulated by these policies.91
In the same sense, Dross and Wolff mention:92
It has been noted that a broad range of terms are eit-
her not defined in the Convention or even if defined
in the Convention are not clear enough and can thus
be interpreted differently by the Parties. One of the
consequences is the invitation in the COP Decision
VII/19 to submit information on existing national
definitions on a number of terms including access to
genetic resources, benefit sharing, commercialization
and derivatives. 
In general, the confusion with respect to activities
that involve access remains. Such is the case with access
requests in certain countries which supposedly deal with
activities related to biological resources.
Box 1. Selected examples of access applications which
involve conventional uses of biological resources.
• Petition for access to genetic resources for camelids
and llama in Bolivia. The goal of the project was
the marketing and live exportation of camelid live-
stock (llamas and alpacas) for the marketing of
their meat in the Middle East. 
• Collection, inventory and preparation of an Atlas
of Wild Peanut were carried out as a proposal for
access to genetic resources.93
• Formation of a Germplasm bank of the species
"xenophiles."94
• Project on the sustainable use of Cohune Palm in
Guatemala for supply of processing oil.95
• Harvesting and selling of Prunus Africana
(barks per kilo).
• In some countries (Ecuador) the term derivatives
has been interpreted to cover medicinal plants as
such.96
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91 Cf. Carrizosa et al., 2004.
92 Dross and Wolff, 2005.
93 Ministry for Sustainable Development, 2004.
94 Febres, 2003.
95 Cfr Dross and Wolff, 2005. See of these authors other examples which might found under the category of biological resources in Cabrera
Medaglia, 2004, A Comparative Analysis..., at Annex 4, Comparative Table of ABS Agreements.
96 Ruiz, 2000.
97 Ten Kate and Laird, 1999; Glowka, 1998.
3.1.1 Refining the concept of genetic resources  
resources," "genetic material of actual or potential
value,"98 utilization of genetic resources and other basic
matters are not defined or not sufficiently clear.99 Little
attention has been paid to the need to precisely define a
number of terms, whose inclusion in the international
ABS Regime100 would improve the effective application
of national ABS systems. 
These are concepts which the IR could help to
clarify in order to create consistent and functional
legal frameworks. There have been important incidences
of legal difficulties arising due to a lack of understanding
regarding the difference between biological resources
and genetic resources.101 Young reports102 five uncer-
tainties regarding the application of ABS principles to
a particular claim of misappropriation, including the
nature of genetic resources. "One area of uncertainty
regarding the application of ABS principles related to
whether the claim is in fact addressing ABS rather
than some other kind of legal concerns....
Unfortunately this is not a simple matter to determine
whether a claim involves genetic resources or not
because it is not possible to know with legal certainty
what a genetic resource is.... More than half of the
public cases [of misappropriation] examined involved
direct uses of either natural products and essences or
remedies using such products and essences and 
naturally or traditionally derived varieties already
being used for conventional agricultural purposes....". 
This question goes to the heart of the CBD 
discussions. From the earliest CBD negotiations, it
was clearly expected that ABS should not alter existing
functional markets and market activities in biological
resources. To create an ABS system without disrupting
conventional markets in biological products, however,
it was necessary to separate the concept of biological
resources (traditional biological commodities) from
genetic resources (the genetic and biochemical infor-
mation which can become the basis for non-conven-
tional uses). 
The boundary between activities involving access
to genetic resources and those that, to the contrary,
make use of biological resources is not always clear.103
In effect, it has been noted that the CBD definitions of
biological and genetic resources are, strictly speaking,
functionally identical so it is not possible to clearly
distinguish between the two.104 Cabrera, commenting
on the implementation of ABS laws mentions:
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98 CBD, Art. 2 Use of Terms.
99 The drafting history of the CBD does not present any particular help to clarify this issue and how some critical issues were not addressed at all
or were addressed in a manner that does not provide enough guidance to policy makers and ABS practitioners. See Glowka, 1994.
100 Decision VII/19 had already mentioned the need to continue working on certain definitions. However, from the point of view of the interna-
tional regime, more than being a matter of simple conceptual clarifications, this has to do with essential aspects that are needed to give the ABS
systems legal consistency and functionality. 
101 For example, the difficulties in analyzing cases of “misappropriation” or “biopiracy” of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, given the
lack of clarity about which activities constitute access to genetic resources (and which would consequently be required to follow the respective
rules) and which, on the other hand, constitute the use of biological resources. Cfr Young, 2006. As noted above, numerous claims have been
based on direct utilization of oils, flours, grains or other extracts milled or taken in conventional ways using naturally occurring or traditional-
ly derived subspecies or varieties. These actions use the variety in the same way that commercial trade in fruit juices used the property of the
fruit, but do not require special genetic-based research or activities. Other claims focus on normal kinds of plant breeding (cross pollination,
hybridization, etc.) or animal breeding. Many such claims are adequately regulated under other laws, suggesting that they do not need to be
covered by ABS law. Likewise, a report on 36 cases of biopiracy in Africa, recently distributed during the Meeting of the Working Group in
Granada, presents some examples in which there are at least well-founded doubts about whether a genetic or biological resource was involved.
Cfr Edmond Institute (undated). 
102 IUCN-Canada, 2005.
103 Cfr Dross and Wolff, 2005. Young notes that “Few concrete mechanisms have been suggested for determining which activities are normal com-
mercial use of biological resources and which are utilization of genetic resources. Some have suggested that genetic resources law applies to new
and unconventional uses of biodiversity in which a user may often need only a relatively small amount of biological material. Once the mate-
rial has been brought into the user country, it can usually be reproduced whether chemically or biologically. As a consequence it is not possible
to control the movement of genetic resources from the source country, the only way to prove a violation of ABS principles is to prove that some-
one has utilized genetic resources. Legal certainty and binding enforcement of ABS agreements will depend on whether the distinction between
biological and genetic resources is clear, unambiguous and instantly recognizable by governments and all other involved parties in all countries.”
Young, 2004, “Genetic Resources...”. 
104 Young, 2004, “Genetic Resources...”.
"Neither does the Convention define what is to be
understood as access and utilization. This has impli-
cated that on the implementation and interpretati-
on of the laws on access, requests have been presented
to access biological resources with exclusively taxono-
mic purposes or for the commercial utilization of
biological resources, without the existence of access to
genetic or biochemical properties contained in the
samples. In other cases, especially where dealing with
the use of medicinal plants, nutraceuticals, botani-
cals, etc., the majority of legislation tends to exclude
them from the scope of access, even though it is con-
sidered an important growth sector at a worldwide
level and that there is an increased interest in bota-
nicals from the private sector.105 Sometimes they are
included, but only where there exists a larger level of
industrialization – another term that is not defined
properly.
In general, the studied legislation bases the definiti-
on of genetic resources on the one provided by the
Convention, with some modifications that do not
alter its essence.  Additionally, the laws define access
to genetic resources and eventually some of the acti-
vities that represent access, such as bioprospecting.
..... it is unclear to what extent the use of a whole
medicinal plant, herbal plants, or nutraceutical food
is an activity which involves access." 106
Typical approaches include:
• Legislation that repeats the definitions of genetic
resources, genetic material and/or biological
resources of the CBD: examples include the
Philippines, Andean Pact, Bhutan, Uganda,107 etc.
• Access legislation that includes all biological
resources in general: The India Biodiversity Law,
and The Model Law of the African Union Countries.
• Legislation of access that applies to biological
resources in general but qualifies the activities by
means of the definition of access or bioprospecting:
India, Venezuela,108 Australia (federal),109 South
Africa, etc.
• Access legislation that defines genetic resources
the same as the CBD, but specifies the meaning
of access, or establishes exceptions for such uses
as "conventional," "traditional" or as an "organic
resource:" Andean Pact, Sarawak (Malaysia),
Costa Rica, Philippines, Uganda, Australia
(Federal) etc.
• Access legislation that defines genetic resources
the same as the CBD and adds biochemical
resources: Costa Rica, Australia (Queensland),
Bhutan.110
• Legislation that contains definitions of genetic
resources that differ from the CBD: Brazil. 111
The confusion increases because even in cases of 
conventional uses of biological resources, benefit-
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105 Ten Kate and Laird, 1999.
106 Regarding this issue, Glowka points out “For example if the blossoms of a plant were harvested as a bulk or biomass commodity for direct use
in an herbal tea or a cosmetic and not for their genetic or biochemical informational value in a technological application, would harvesting and
export trigger the prior informed consent and mutually agreed terms provisions under the legislation? The supplier of the blossom more than
likely has or will negotiate a supply agreement with the users. This presumably reflects a mutually agreed price to supply a certain quantity of
the blossom at a particular price... Benefits therefore will accrue without creating a new regulatory regime....However if for example, cells from
the blossoms or seed from plants were used as the basis for a cell culture or farm cultivation to mass produce an active ingredient, then they are
being used as a genetic resource.”  Glowka, 1999.
107 In these cases, access or bioprospecting is sometimes also defined. 
108 The Biodiversity Law of Venezuela is not clear. The scope of the access provisions refers in some cases to biodiversity resources and in others to
genetic resources.
109 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment Regulations, 2005.
110 These legislations also define access, bioprospecting or biodiscovery. 
111 The Provisional Measure of Brazil defines Genetic Heritage as follows: “information of genetic origin contained in the samples of all or part of
plant, fungal, microbial or animal species, in the form of molecules and substances originating in the metabolism of these living beings or from
extracts obtained from in situ or ex situ conditions... ”. The Biodiversity Law of Costa Rica and the Access Norms (regulations) defines sepa-
rately genetic resources and genetic elements, the genetic resources concept is based on the idea of some degree of human intervention. 
A variety of options have been developed114 that
countries can consider as ways of clarifying the concept
of genetic resources/biological resources for the purpos-
es of their national legislative systems. These include: 
Option 1: Determining whether the law will recognize
any difference between biological and
genetic resources, keeping in mind the
intrinsic difficulties involved in control-
sharing provisions in line with the CBD have been
developed. For example, the BioTrade Initiative of
UNCTAD, which focuses only on extracts and natu-
ral ingredients, includes detailed provisions for com-
pliance with national ABS requirements.112
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112 It is noted that some important initiatives, especially the BioTRADE initiative of UNCTAD (see www.biotrade.org), are designing specialized
programmes which apply the principles of ABS, in an abbreviated form, to the use of natural extracts (that is, of “biological resources”), espe-
cially in cosmetics and other consumer products. See the Informal Expert Workshop on Practical Guidelines for equitable sharing of benefits of
biological resources in BioTrade Activities, Meeting Report, September 2006. BioTRADE joins a number of other actors who feel that the need
for and importance of benefit sharing extends not only to genetic resources but to all components of biodiversity. The Addis Ababa Principles
and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, for example, adopted by the Seventh Conference of the Parties of the CBD, include sev-
eral references to this idea.
113 Cfr www.biotrade.org. See the Informal Expert Workshop on Practical Guidelines for equitable sharing of benefits of biological resources in
BioTrade Activities, Meeting Report, September 2006 which indicates ”... equitable benefit sharing also arises in the context of the second objec-
tive of the CBD: the sustainable use of biodiversity. In this context, the need and importance of benefit sharing extends not only to genetic
resources but to all components of biodiversity. The Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, for exam-
ple, adopted by the Seventh Conference of the Parties of the CBD, include several references to this effect.”
114 Young, 2004, “An Implementation Perspective...”.
The objective of the BioTrade Initiative of the UNCTAD is to contribute to the implementation of the three
objectives of the CBD by means of the promotion of trade and investment in products and services of
BioTrade. Based on the experience of the National BioTrade Programs, a set of principles of BioTrade have been
developed, that are agreed upon between the Initiative and the Programs. One of them (principle 3) refers to
the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the use of biodiversity. Eventually these Principles and
Criteria could be verified and certified with the aim of differentiating products derived from BioTrade.
Among the products selected by the Initiative or the National Programs and supported by the BioTrade
Facilitation Program ( BTFP) are:
• Alligator meat and hide (caiman and yacare);
• Cacao;
• Ecotourism;
• Tropical flowers and foliage;
• Wild fauna for pets;
• Natural ingredients for the food, cosmetic and pharmaceutical industries;
• Ornamental and comestible fish.
The natural ingredients include: colorants for the cosmetic and food industries; essential oils for the cosmetic
and food industries; vegetable oils for these industries; powdered fruit pulp for the food industry (supplements
and additives); vegetable extracts for the phyto-pharmaceutical and food industries. The market for natural prod-
ucts encompasses: fresh or dehydrated medicinal plants; fruits, pulps, fruit oils; herbal extracts; vegetable oils;
essential oils; natural colorants and many ingredients of this nature for which demand has been increasing.
Box 2. Benefit sharing and the BioTrade Initiative of UNCTAD113
ling conventional uses of biological
resources within the framework of ABS
systems. 
Option 2: Considering genetic resources to be a more
specialized type of material, as compared
with the general category of biological
resources; for example, a genetic resource
might be a particular type of material
taken in a specific way, such as prepared
dry materials. 
Option 3: Setting the distinction based on the inten-
ded use on the part of the applicant at the
time of access, for example, whether
access to the materials is sought for con-
ventional purposes or with the intention
of utilizing them for their genetic or bio-
chemical characteristics. 
Option 4: Deciding that "genetic resource" refers to
genetic information, independent of 
physical access to it. 
Option 5: Deciding that genetic resources could
be best understood as the "right to use
genetic information."115
No solution is simple. Considering the interna-
tional and transboundary nature of ABS relations and
the need for consistency and legal certainty,116 it is
hoped that the International Regime should provide
the countries with some guidance on this matter.
The following discussion section explores some
approaches to applying the different options or crite-
ria to clarify this critical issue.
3.1.1.1 The utilitarian approach 
According to some, the definition of genetic resources
(in the CBD) is relatively clear. For them, the ques-
tion is simply establishing an agreed distinction
between genetic material and genetic resources. They
do not recognize any physical distinction: "a genetic
resource is a genetic resource rather than a genetic
material because we perceive it as a resource, that is,
we attach value to it." 
In essence, if one adopts a physical approach to
defining these terms, genetic resources and biological
resources are synonymous; if one adopts a utilization-
based conceptual approach, then perhaps the terms
can be distinguished. This suggests the CBD intends
Parties to the Convention to adopt a conceptual or
utilitarian rather than physical or natural view of
genetic resources. However, the language of the CBD
definitions and other articles does not indicate how a
utilitarian approach should or could be constructed,
and especially, how it can be applied.
Numerous examples can be cited to illustrate the
legal importance of line-drawing - that is, of making
it clear which resources are "biological resources" (not
governed by ABS), and which are genetic (ABS
applies). For instance, is the seed or tuber of an agricul-
tural crop, a genetic resource or a biological resource? 
Under the utilitarian approach, the purpose in
collecting a particular seed or tuber of an agricultural
crop would define whether it was considered to be
either a genetic resource – and thus regulated under
ABS law – or a biological resource – and thus 
unregulated. It is at this point that the construction of
the utilitarian approach becomes important. The
genetic resource does not lie in the properties of the
species, (color, taste, etc.), per se, but in the possibility
that they may be multiplied, propagated, transferred
into other varieties or species or synthesized for use in
some scientific or industrial purpose (although it is
not clear if there should be a limit on its application
for scientific purposes). Ensuring that this is reflected
in a regulatory regime is purely a question of recognizing
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115 This definition makes it possible, at least theoretically, to deal with the issue of access to information that is available electronically, such as that
deposited in data bases. The same information generated by genomic and proteonomic projects, for example, may gradually substitute physical
access to samples, conceived as part of the normal or traditional collection process of ABS projects. Curiously, the international regime nego-
tiators have not paid much attention to the impact of these technologies and the means of generating information on ABS proposals and sys-
tems, perhaps due to their technical complexity and the lack of analysis of their legal implications. Cf. on the topic, Oldam, 2005.
116 Cfr Young, 2004, “Genetic Resources...”. 
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the problem and carefully drafting accordingly.
A problem that must be considered in the devel-
opment of an utilitarian approach is the possibility of
dishonesty on the part of the applicants for access to
genetic resources. Once the resources are out of the
jurisdiction of country of origin, it is not possible to
control these resources and therefore not possible to
know of and ensure a share in the associated benefits.
Cabrera, after the analysis of most ABS laws in place,
concludes that: "In general in most of the cases studied,
there is no provision to differentiate the taking of 
biological resources (the organic material) from the
taking of the genetic material contained in the biological
material. The difference should be based on the
intended or declared use: the search for genetic or 
biochemical material contained in the biological
specimen, for different purposes (basic research, 
bioprospecting, etc.). Supposedly, in some countries
the taking of biological resources must comply with
certain requirements, including the information 
provided by the applicant before granting removal.
This information should contain details on the
intended use and therefore if the proposed use implies
access to genetic resources, the competent authority
must refer the applicant to the appropriate legal body
in charge of granting access in order to initiate the
legal procedures for access and benefit sharing...."
"It can be concluded that utilization of genetic
resources is not defined. In general terms, the practice
is based on the intended use of the biological
resources, as a source of genetic information. For this
reason, the only way to control the use of organic
resources not as genetic information for different 
purposes (bioprospecting, scientific research, etc.) is
looking at the information submitted by the applicant
of the permit and whether it states that the access to
the biological resource is for different purposes other
than for its genetic composition. The intended use is
the key aspect for knowing when a person is seeking
access to genetic resources."
In accordance with this line of thinking, the 
difference between access to genetic resources and
biological ones is the "intended use," that is, the
declared purpose for which the applicant indicates
that he desires access to a sample of a material. If this
purpose is the search for new biochemical compounds
for the creation of medicines or similar uses, the activity
would involve access to genetic resources. If, for
example, the purpose is to collect specimens only for
taxonomic identification, this activity would not be
considered access. 117
However, the utilitarian approach faces some 
difficulties.118 "One theoretically clear understanding
of 'genetic resources' is use of biological material for
certain intentions or purposes. This defining criterion
could link the scope of access legislation to the "purpose
or intention" of the person or company having access
to the biological material. This, however, implies a
challenge for access legislation: As functional units of
heredity are present in biological material also when
sold for the purpose of commodities, the scope of
access legislation would solely have been depending
upon the purpose or intention of the one seeking to
move biological resources across a border. The genetic
resources could be said to cover certain intended uses
of biological or genetic material.
"The primary intention of the use of biological
117 For some, this is the most appropriate solution. Cfr Dross and Wolff, 2005. Others believe that this would involve considerable legal difficul-
ties in determining the legality of access. The difficulties mentioned include problems in objectively determining the applicant’s intention; the
possibility of his later being granted a different use of the collected materials by a third party - and possibly some time after the original collec-
tion was made, etc. Cfr Tvedt, 2006; and Young, 2004, “Genetic Resources...,”.
118 With regard to the intentional approach, Young criticizes: “There is no objective way to distinguish these actions from obtaining access to genetic
resources. The only difference is the intention of the person taking the action. In ABS, it can be particularly complicated having so many different
persons, actions, and intentions between the original collection of a biosample and the point when its genetic resources are utilized commercially.
It is not objectively clear whether access to genetic resources occurs at the time the biological specimen is collected from the wild or the farm or at
the time the genetic resources material is first intentionally studied, extracted or otherwise utilized in commercial or other development. Moreover
there are many possible situations in which the relevant genetic and biochemical information can be transferred without collection of physical 
material. A gene sequence or a biochemical formula may be expressed on paper and sent to a researcher in another country by mail. In 2005, it
is thought to be too difficult and costly to build genetic material into products solely from a gene sequence without a sample reference. That sci-
entific capacity is expected to be developed substantially during the next decade.”  Young, 2004, “Genetic Resources...,”.
material typically changes over time. The purpose of
the use typically changes after the genetic material has
left the country. When the original intention is altered,
access legislation targeting the primary intention will
not be robust enough to capture the value created later.
This constitutes a major obstacle and perhaps implies
that it is impossible to control and reserve all exports
or "access" to genetic material by this criterion.
"The intention is not manifest in any objective
manner at the point in time of access. It is hardly pos-
sible to overview the intention of each individual trans-
fer of biological material containing functional units of
heredity. To control the intention of each exporter of
biological material is not at all easy for the provider
country. To base a court case or enforcement mecha-
nism upon a criterion as subjective as the intention that
the exporter originally had is close to impossible. To
prove that the original intention was another than
using the biological material in bulk is not an easy task
before a court.
"Choosing intention as criterion will also not cre-
ate the predictable situation for research and industry:
Such an understanding of the concept ‘genetic resources’
will not easily meet the call from industry for a clear and
stable legal situation. Choosing intention as the defining
criterion will not establish a clear and predictable situa-
tion for researchers or industry receiving biological
material. Both researchers and industry need to be faced
with a clear legal status for the genetic material that they
bring to laboratory for research and developmen."119
In synthesis, although the majority of legislation
appears to have indirectly adopted the intentional crite-
rion, this presents legislative and administrative prob-
lems relating to the determination of the existence of
access, a legislative element that depends on the collec-
tor's intent at the time of collection, limiting the possi-
bility of judging objectively whether the applicant truly
intends to conduct activities of access. It makes it diffi-
cult for the administrative or judicial authorities to
make an objective determination of compliance or of
potential non-compliance with legislation regulating
access to genetic resources, limiting the legal certainty of
the provider, the user, and subsequent acquirers of the
samples. Moreover, the intentional approach does not
permit adequate control without the existence of meas-
ures that allows the source to know "utilization" of
genetic resources has taken place. 
3.1.1.2 Genetic resources as the "utilization of
genetic information"
With regard to this potential solution Tvedt affirms
that:120
"To understand what is meant by 'genetic resources,'
there is a need to look closer at the [phrase] 'of actual
or commercial value,' in the definition of genetic
material." This qualifier establishes a distinction
between genetic material and genetic resources, 
establishing the latter as a specific type of natural
resource.  The distinction focuses on certain types of
value from biological/genetic material. The difficult
question is which types of value that the CBD seeks
to capture by the definition of genetic resources. The
term 'actual or potential value' can be understood
as the value of the biological material when it is
used by taking advantage of the functional units of
heredity. If this understanding of the legal concept is
applied, the concept 'genetic resources' will be geared
towards uses of biological material for certain 
purposes or categories of uses. 
[It will then be clear that] Article 15 seeks to 
capture the value created from taking advantage of
the genes (the functional units of heredity) in the
biological material. Thus functional units of heredi-
ty (genetic material) - present in all biological mate-
rial, even when used for bulk purposes - could poten-
tially be used in breeding or replicating that speci-
men. Therefore, to control access by regulating export
of genetic material is not at all possible or probably
not even preferable. The vast majority of biological
commodities contain genes and thus have potential to
be used for their genetic material. Only small quan-
ta of biological samples can be sufficient to capture
the interesting genetic material. A necessary precondi-
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119 Tvedt, 2006, and see detailed discussion of this issue in Tvedt and Young, 2007.
120 Tvedt, 2006. 
Substantive scope/definitions:
"Biological resources" includes organisms or parts thereof, populations, or any other biotic component of
ecosystems with actual or potential use or value for humanity;
"Genetic resources" means biological resources, including parts and components, with the exception of:
• any biological resource for which the intended purpose does not involve cultivation or reproduction by
means of any natural or artificial technique, including biological resources for conventional uses, and
• any other biological resource or use of such resource the Minister may prescribe in regulations;
"Parts and components" includes functional units of heredity, DNA sequences, chemical compounds, second-
ary metabolites, biochemicals and other similar material and transcriptions of information describing any of
the above in terms of structure or similar technical details;
tion for effective access legislation to create benefit-
sharing, would require prevention of unauthorized
access. As there are major obstacles related to control-
ling export of genetic material such exclusive control
will not be possible. Therefore, the defining criteria
for genetic resources need to be further explored."
As a possible solution, it has been suggested that
the term "actual or potential value" associated with
genetic resources should be understood in the context
of the CBD. In this way, the obligation of benefit 
sharing has its origin in "the benefits arising out of
the utilization of genetic resources" and "the results of
research and development and the benefits arising out
of the commercial or other use of genetic resources"
(art. 15.7). From this perspective, the term "genetic
resource" should be understood to be all activities that
result in capturing the real or potential value of gene-
tic resources. Thus, it is suggested that instead of 
focusing on the intention of the party requiring access,
the concept of genetic resources should be linked to
specific uses. This would also lay the groundwork for
user countries to issue measures in their territories,
based on certain categories of utilization.121 (This
approach is further discussed under the general head-
ing of "the utilization issue," at 3.1.3, below.)
3.1.1.3 The permanent access criteria
A different approach uses a more objective consideration.
If the sample is re-used (more or less directly – that is,
as a whole specimen, direct extract, etc., without sci-
entific/genetic alteration) as an ingredient in the pro-
duction of commercial goods, it is not considered to be
access to genetic resources, but the utilization of bio-
logical resources for conventional uses. Nevertheless,
although this distinction can be used for the definition
of genetic resources, without the establishment of
measures that permit control over the utilization of
the resources, it would present the same problems
enumerated in the case of the utilitarian approach.
However, it lends certainty to the moment of access
and over legal procedures to follow, according to
whether it is access to genetic resources or convention-
al uses of biological resources.
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121 Cfr Tvedt, 2006, who calls this the “catalog approach.” 
122 Lettington and Dogley, 2006. NOTE: As of this writing, this bill has not been adopted.
Box 3. Excerpts (Definitions) from the Seychelles Draft Law on Access to Genetic Resources122
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Explaining the meaning of those definitions the authors point out: 
First, the main element of the definition of parts and components to note is the word 'include', which is used to cle-
arly state that the following list of examples is not exclusive. Equally, the items in this list are not necessarily mutual-
ly exclusive. For example, a DNA sequence might be considered a functional unit of heredity or a secondary meta-
bolite might be considered a chemical compound. The key point to note is that the list is not trying to be scientifical-
ly precise: it is actually a political, rather than scientific, list and the aim is to ensure that it is understood that the
definition clearly intends to include any possible element of a genetic resource. 
Second, the reference to transcriptions of information is intended to ensure that rights are being claimed to any writ-
ten source, or some other form of communication, describing the basic characteristics of a genetic resource. This is
increasingly important as the details of materials' genetic or chemical structure can be unraveled and then sent by e-
mail, fax etc. ever more rapidly. Finally, the term 'parts and components' could have been added to the definition of
biological resources with equal effect, genetic resources being a subset of biological resources. However, the placing in
the context of the definition of genetic resources is intentional, as a means to emphasize its role within the context of
the legislation.
... the CBD definition of genetic resources only highlights the fact that countries should define the term in a utilita-
rian (as opposed to a natural or physical) manner, but does not actually provide a definition itself. This issue is, 
therefore, subject to national interpretation.... The approach taken in Seychelles is based on the same basic structure
that can be found in the CBD, namely the identification of a general group and then of a subset of this group. The
general group can be found in the definition of biological resources, which is intended to cover all biological material.
This matches the CBD definition of the same term, with one exception, which is that the reference to genetic resources
has been deleted because it was not felt that this added anything substantive to the broad scope of the definition and
created a risk of confusion. 
The development of the definition of genetic resources was one of the most thoroughly discussed aspects of the develop-
ment of the legislation, due to its central role in determining which activities would fall within the scope of the legis-
lation and which would remain outside. 
The most obvious exclusion was one for commodities, such as fish for consumption and other foodstuffs. This exclu-
sion operates at a range of levels from a need not to burden Seychelles' significant fish processing industry all the way
down to the question of household shopping. In a more specific context a range of other activities, including taxono-
mic research, the production of essential oils and the collection of wild materials for household use, were considered
and, to varying degrees, proved controversial. For the purpose of establishing a generally applicable principle... the
basic line between what use of a biological resource should make it a genetic resource and what use shouldn't (i.e. the
line between uses regulated by the legislation and those not provided for) could be drawn on the basis of whether the
intended use focused on the commodity nature of a resource or on some other property. The main strength of this
approach is that it automatically excludes the majority of foodstuffs and other directly extractive and consumptive
activities. 
The basic solution that was developed is the text of subsection (a) of the definition, which focuses regulation on acti-
vities that involve cultivation or reproduction, i.e. that mean that the recipient of material is not dependent on the
source in Seychelles after the initial collection. Where the recipient of material will continue to be dependent on the
source in Seychelles, i.e. commodity transactions, this is not regulated by the legislation on the understanding that such
situations are most effectively regulated by traditional natural resource extraction systems. Such systems typically con-
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123 In a similar approach, the Draft Biological Resources Bill of the Northern Territories in Australia lists activities that do not constitute “bio-
prospecting:” fishing for commerce, harvesting of wild flowers, taking wild animals or plants for food, collecting peat or firewood, taking essen-
tial oils from wild plants, collecting plant reproductive material for propagation, and commercial forestry.
sist of a price set according to the volume of material and the known uses of that material. To avoid the regulation of
generally accepted uses that might fall within this definition of genetic resources the concept of conventional uses, dis-
cussed below, is introduced as an exception. ..... To allow for situations that might not reasonably fall within the des-
cription of conventional uses, but that it might not be deemed appropriate to regulate as access to genetic resources,
subsection (b) of the definition was introduced to provide the authorities with future flexibility to make exclusions as
necessary. This follows the basic principle clearly established by stakeholders: an inclusive approach to regulation with
exceptions to be established as necessary.
Supplementary scope definitions:
"Conventional uses"123 means widely practiced and accepted uses such as - 
(a) The local collection of wild genetic resources for cultivation in home or kitchen gardens and intended 
primarily for domestic use,
(b) the sale or exchange of agricultural produce for food or feed purposes,
(c) traditional fermentation techniques,
(d) the saving, using, exchanging or selling of farm-saved seed or propagating material among farmers, 
or
(e) any other use the Minister may prescribe in regulations.
Explanation from the author:
The term "conventional uses" is different from "parts and components" in that, rather than clarifying the defi-
nition of genetic resources, it creates an essential exception to its scope. As mentioned earlier, the broad issue
relates to what might be considered as generally accepted uses of biological resources that Seychelles deems it
unnecessary or counter-productive to regulate through access to genetic resources.
Subsection (c) was probably the most controversial of the specific conventional use exceptions. Discussion covered
distillation, both for alcohol and essential oils, and other similar activities as well as fermentation. As with 
subsection (b), the focus of the genetic resources definition on cultivation and reproduction might be seen to 
render this exception redundant. However, some activities, particularly fermentation, do involve the reproduction
of biological resources. In addition, the fact that some stakeholders feel that the regulation, and taxation, of this
kind of activity is currently inadequate suggests that access to genetic resources might be seen as a means to 
capture benefits. The conclusion, based on a majority opinion, was that fermentation, as an indicative example,
should be excluded and that the other related forms of activity, particularly distillation, should also be excluded,
as they are not really issues of access to genetic resources. If there are problems based on the perception that, in
their commercial form, distillation or fermentation profit from the biological resources of Seychelles in a manner
that is inequitable in terms of individual versus national benefit then this could be more effectively addressed
through taxation or licensing.
As is suggested by the discussion of subsection (c), above, the list of specific examples of conventional uses is not
intended to be exhaustive. It is primarily intended to provide an interpretative guide for use by the authorities. 
Another conceptual issue relevant to legal certainty is
the concept of derivatives. Since the negotiations 
surrounding the Bonn Guidelines, and particularly in
the COP 6 in The Hague, one of the most controver-
sial topics has been that of derivatives and products
and their relationship to access PIC and MAT. This
discussion eventually resulted in the inclusion of
"derivatives and products" in the Bonn Guidelines'
discussion of benefit sharing. Thus, paragraph 44 of
the Bonn Guidelines presents a list indicating the
mutually agreed conditions included under point i:
"provisions regarding the sharing of benefits arising
from the commercial and other utilization of genetic
resources and their derivatives and products."
Likewise, with regard to the procedures for obtaining
prior informed consent, the Guidelines indicate in
paragraph 36 (l) (in mentioning the information to be 
presented) the "kinds/types of benefits that could
result from obtaining access to the resource, including
benefits from derivatives and products arising from
the commercial or other utilization of the genetic
resource."
According to their terms, the Bonn Guidelines
are entirely "voluntary" (meaning in this case that
countries have complete discretion as to whether to
apply them); and in some cases, such as their provi-
sions on the contents of PIC and MAT, and the lists
of benefits and benefit sharing, they are doubly or
triply voluntary, since these provisions are expressly
made optional and expressed in non-mandatory lan-
guage.124 While the topic of derivatives is also includ-
ed in the International Regime negotiations125 (in
fact, this discussion promises to be one of the most
difficult due to the strong interest developing coun-
tries have shown in including derivatives and products
in the International Regime),126 it is also a matter of
national legislative concern for source countries. 
In order to fully understand the issue, it is neces-
sary to explain a few premises that may in some way
contribute to advancing international negotiations on
this subject. A number of national laws contain defini-
tions of "genetic resources" that are much broader than
the CBD's, applying access procedures equally to deriv-
atives.127 In similar fashion, some national regulations
extend the coverage of their access regimes by including
"biochemicals" within the definition.128 Also, it may be
possible to interpret the CBD language itself as includ-
ing derivatives, if it is accepted that the object of ABS
regulations is to share benefits from the use of "genetic
information" rather than tying them only to the mate-
rial in a physical sense.
On this basis, one might wonder if it is necessary to
regulate access to derivatives per se or if, on the contrary,
it is more appropriate to clarify that they are covered in
regulations on access to the genetic resources from which
they are derived. If the second option eases the concerns
of developing countries, it is undoubtedly preferable, as
long as it allows the derivatives to be subject to PIC and
mutually agreed terms, including those related to benefit
sharing (through access to genetic resources). In this way,
the benefits arising from the genetic resources can be
identified and monitored through mechanisms that
should be incorporated in the international regime, such
as the certificate of origin/source/legal provenance, the
disclosure of origin in IPR applications, and contractual
arrangements on which access is based, as well as their
monitoring clauses.129
It is equally important to recognize that the term
"derivative" itself is not entirely clear. Glowka already
noted concerns in 1998 in mentioning that 
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124 See generally paragraph 7 of the Bonn Guidelines as well as the above cited sections.
125 In the discussions and negotiations, both within the ABS Working Group and in the VII and VIII Conferences of the Parties, there have been recur-
ring disagreements regarding the inclusion or not of derivatives and products. See Annex to COP VIII, Decision VIII/4, UNEP/CBD/COP/8/4,
for example, to note how the references to derivatives and products are bracketed in the paragraphs where they are mentioned.
126 From the commercial point of view, it must be accepted that derivatives or biochemicals – if they are accepted as equivalent – are very valuable
for the pharmaceutical industry. Cfr Battig in this respect, cited by Wolff and Dross, 2005. 
127 See Cabrera Medaglia, A Comparative Analysis, 2004.
128 See, for example, the Biodiversity Law of Costa Rica, articles 4, 6 and 7.
129 See in a similar sense, Tvedt, 2006. 
3.1.2 An access-based (source country) view of the issue of derivatives 
There are two contexts in which the term derivative
applies. In the first, derivatives may be described as
non-modified chemical components other than DNA
or RNA, but formed by the organisms' metabolic pro-
cesses. As in the case of DNA or RNA, these components
exist in samples of biological materials obtained under
ex-situ or in-situ conditions. Derivatives in this con-
text, for example, may constitute active biological com-
ponents found in the collected plant material, but that
have yet to be modified and used in technological appli-
cations. In the second context, derivatives can consist of
chemical components that are modified and created or
synthesized from materials originally obtained from in-
situ or ex-situ sources. The resulting end products may
be a hybrid seed, a traditional medicine or the synthe-
tic version of a biochemical extract. Thus, they are pro-
ducts that are derived or synthesized from genetic or
biochemical resources through human intervention.
Access legislation may be extended to derivatives in the
first context. However, it would be very difficult to
extend it in the second context in that this would be a
matter of regulating access to technologies.130
Casas coincides with this view when he states that
The international regime should not only cover genetic
resources, but also their derivatives, understood as natu-
ral molecules that do not contain genetic information,
but have resulted from a genetic resource. That is to say,
they are compounds, extracts or secretions that occur as
a natural expression of the genetic material and are the
result of a metabolic process.131
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3.1.3 The utilization issue 
On this basis, it seems obvious that there is a need for
clarification on the issues of utilization. This suggests a
problem for source-oriented legislation, since utilization
typically happens in another country. While it is hoped
that the International Regime negotiations might
resolve the concept involved, it will almost certainly not
substitute for national legislation, nor will it be finished
and implemented quickly. The task of national imple-
mentation will also be eased if those negotiations should
address relevant criteria or a catalogue of uses that would
be relevant for confining the user obligation.
In the meantime, however, the need for national
legislative and administrative approaches in source coun-
tries remains critical. There may be a need (or advantage)
in this process for reformulation of source country
(access) legislation, to coincide with a benefit-sharing
approach based on the idea of the use or utilization of the
GR. In this connection, it is notable that the concept of
"access to genetic resources" has not been defined either.
If "access" means the ability to collect samples, then ben-
efit sharing and/or utilization of genetic resources may
not necessarily be based on access to genetic resources.132
Both the CBD (article 1) and the Johannesburg Plan of
Action refer to the need to share the benefits arising out
of the utilization of genetic resources, but do not tie this
to the fact that such resources have been "accessed." The
catalogue approach (listing activities that constitute
genetic resources utilization) is primarily a tool of user-
oriented legislation, but could be a useful tool for access
legislation as well, if (after) user countries have adopted
it. Particularly where the country defines "genetic
resources" or "access" based on intended use of the
resources, it will be necessary to determine which intend-
ed uses require ABS compliance.  Such legislation must
include a list of activities or intentions. 
In any case, it should not be forgotten that the
principal purpose of such a legislative reformulation
would be to provide certainty – both for users and for
130 Glowka, 1998. Likewise, according to Burton, the problem of derivatives is due to there being two interpretations or uses of the term deriva-
tives. On the one hand, there are those who refer to derivatives as products or innovations originating from biological materials; their underly-
ing concern is to control the commercialization or utilization of genetic resources in order to obtain a share of the benefits. Conversely, others
address the topic from the perspective of the inadequacy of the CBD definition of genetic resources in not including the organisms’ compo-
nents, the interaction of genes and the biochemical compounds they express. Cfr Burton, 2004. 
131 Casas, 2004. 
132 The Annex to Decision VIII/4 contains some references to the use of the financial mechanism in cases in which the countries of origin of the
genetic resources and derivatives cannot be identified.
In general, the application of the traditional rights
over tangible property to genetic resources can be 
difficult, raising, it has been affirmed, "Key questions
of property ownership ... ABS created a new kind of
commodity that is either intangible or possessed of a
very complex legal status. No existing law is clear
about who holds such rights."136 In this connection, a
study done in the Pacific Rim countries indicates the
following:137
Evidently the information component of genetic
resources is the most valuable for bioprospectors.
However, no State has created a property rights system
for this component. Therefore, Countries still rely on the
physical component (e.g., organisms or their parts) to
define the legal status of their genetic (and biochemical)
resources.
In legal doctrine, a general classification of property
as tangible, corporal, or intangible has been established.
In the case of genetic resources, there may be a basis for
distinction between the rights over the physical entity
(physical property) and over the genetic information
that the resources contain (intangible property). This
As noted above, the Convention on Biological
Diversity has created a new system of property and
commercial transactions for a specific material: genetic
resources. This new property right was developed with
the implicit understanding that the application of the
property right to tangible property would be adequate
and sufficient in the case of genetic resources, but that
approach did not consider several circumstances.
For example, the assignment of exclusive rights to
the physical property (rights to keep it, hold or change
it, to exclude others, etc.), is based on the possibility
of exercising physical control over the property. In the
case of genetic information, its access and use cannot
be controlled by means of the exercise of traditional
(physical) property rights.
Another problem is the need to describe property,
in order to exert rights to it. How it is possible to
describe with sufficient clarity, the intangible component
of genetic resources in order to permit the creation of
property rights over genetic information?134 The
notion of genetic resources as natural or inherent
information has been suggested by diverse authors.135
Here also, there is some reason to hope that the
international negotiations may provide assistance in
these matters, however, the basic property law issues –
development of new property systems or adaptation of
traditional and conventional property systems to this
new kind of property – will always be clearly matters
of national governance, so that national legislative
solutions, which are urgent now, will still be necessary
and relevant, if any part of the international negotiation
result provides critical agreements on supporting
points. 
the source country. With this in mind, independently
of the criteria or lists to be used, the national laws –
and international negotiations – should establish clearly
the scope of the activities covered by the laws of access
and which are excluded. At the same time, to give
functionality to the system, it would be desirable that
these criteria were harmonized by means of interna-
tional decisions.133
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3.2 Property rights in genetic resources
3.2.1 Applying existing law of property to genetic resources 
133 E.g., clearly regulate that bulk use of biological resources as ingredients in commercial products, herbal medicine, cosmetics, does not consti-
tute access.
134 Cfr Glowka, 1998.
135 See Vogel, 1998.
136 Young, 2004, “An Implementation perspective...”.
137 Carrizosa et al.
The issue of property rights is very complex,139 raising
questions and concerns relating to sovereignty, her-
itage and property – three very different legal issues.
Of these, the latter is not addressed by the
Convention, leaving each State free to decide if genet-
ic resources are private or public property and under
what circumstances. This issue is not fully clear in
comparative law, because, in general, prior to 1992
(and indeed up to the present) most national proper-
ty systems and constitutions, with few exceptions,
have not made reference to genetic resources. 
3.2.2.1 National law on the property 
interest in genetic resources
There are, however, a few legal systems that do make
a property-based distinction between biological
resources and genetic resources. Generally, the State is
considered the owner of genetic resources (and mobile
biological resources), although the owner of the land
must be contacted to gain permission to collect the
biological resource containing the genetic resource or
authorizes the entrance to the land where the resource
is located or to the ex-situ collection which is consid-
ered the provider of the biological resource. 
The issue of property rights over genetic
resources is very important in the ABS legislative con-
text for two reasons:
• It is critical for determining the right to partici-
pate in the decision-making processes of ABS
and be beneficiary of the potential benefits.
• It can be a source of limitations on private action,
derived from the concept of genetic resources as
public property.
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last represents the real value of the resources, and where
the judicial problems are particularly complex.138
The material and geographic aspects of genetic
resources pose an extraordinary challenge because
most living organisms reproduce and disperse natural-
ly, irrespective of restrictive measures that policy mak-
ers wish to lay on them, carrying out into the world
the very qualities (genetic resources) that bioprospec-
tors and users are seeking rights in, and source coun-
tries are seeking to control. This biological fact is
compounded by the elusive nature of information as
valued added: information, even when derived from
biological resources, is intangible and therefore
requires a special property regime.
138 Cfr Febres, 2002.
139 Concerning legal certainty, one of the most pertinent aspects to be studied regards the definition of physical property rights to genetic resources,
as recognized by the COP 8 when it requested the Parties to provide information to the Secretariat. CBD COP VII, Decision VIII/4,
UNEP/CBD/COP/8/4, part A.
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3.2.2 Property rights issues generally
3.2.2.2 Applying conventional property 
law to genetic resources
Tenure and ownership systems are not uniform across
the countries nor are they clearly defined in any given
country. Based on their own legislative heritage and
legal cultural traditions, countries exhibit a mixture of
ownership arrangements that range from traditional
common tenure to state-enforced private rights to
land and resources, including the broad diversity of
biological material.141 Analysts have identified a few
general categories among countries' legal systems,
which are quite useful for purposes of discussion, but
should not be considered to imply national similarity
among countries within each category:
• Common Law Systems: In these countries, natural
resources are frequently viewed as primarily 
"private property," however the legal fact is that
the state retains powers to regulate them or to
control, limit or even prevent their use. 
• Roman-Napoleonic Systems: Systems founded on
Roman Law include concepts of private proper-
ty, but usually recognize natural resources as
property of the State, or patrimony. A number of
these countries have directly regulated genetic
resources, providing that they are public property
and/or in the domain of the State.142
• Other legal systems: There are basically three other
categories of legal system - religious law, custom-
ary law, and central-plan-based law. Under these
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140 See Note 36 above, the US information is based on a permit system that was adopted for collection of specimens in national parks. It is not clear
that this limited statement embodies the USA’s law on genetic resources, since it (i) was made by one agency (ii) applies to less than 4% of the
country’s land area and (iii) applies to only one property owner out of the millions of property owners.
141 Columbia University, 1999.
142 Cfr Pérez, 1997.
Table 2. Examples of different approaches to property rights on genetic resources in selected countries
Country Approach to property issues
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Andean Community The legislation establishes specifically the property rights
over genetic resources and establishes a system of public
domain.
Philippines (not totally clear in the case of 
the ex-situ resources and domesticated ones);
Nigeria, possibly the USA
Wild flora or fauna and natural resources in general are
considered the property of the state, but not expressly
mentioned. In some countries (USA, Nigeria), the gene-
tic resources located, for example, in national parks are
considered property of the state, but this fact is not men-
tioned expressly in the national laws, and not clear in
other situations.
India, Brazil, Bhutan, Uganda There are no specific regulations over property, but the
state has the right to control or authorize the use of gene-
tic resources.
Australia, (possibly the USA),140 Canada Countries in which there are private property rights over
genetic resources, but the state preserves a limited power to
control (species in danger of extinction, etc.).
Malaysia, Kenya Relationship between state property and the common
and indigenous rights is not clear. 
three, private property concepts may not exist, or
may involve a much stronger level of primary
oversight and control.
While most countries believe themselves within one
of these categories, the practical reality is that a mixed
approach applies in virtually all countries.
3.2.2.3 Public domain
Many countries have specifically determined that a
special status of ownership-related rights applies in
the case of genetic resources. For example, in the case
of Colombia, the Council of State determined in
Decision C-977 that "the legal regime applicable to
genetic resources of real or potential utility, is that
which is established in general terms in the Political
Constitution for public domain goods....", that is,
genetic resources are inalienable, unattachable and
imprescriptible, and the Nation's heritage. This is
generally how the concept of the public domain is
characterized. Most countries' legislations define
other resources possessing such attributes, such as
water, minerals, wildlife, hydrocarbons, and the mar-
itime land zone, in the same way. 
3.2.2.4 The example of Costa Rica
In a number of countries, national legislation declares
(or treats) genetic and biochemical resources as goods
of public domain. One example relevant to this dis-
cussion is the legal regime in the Costa Rican system. 
The public domain goods (goods that may be
considered as belonging to a public body) are linked to
public utility purposes, therefore, they are subject to a
special administrative regime of protection and use of
goods. Thus, characteristics of the goods of public
domain are three: (1) ownership to a public body; (2)
public utility purposes; and (3) under a special admin-
istrative regime of protection and use of goods.  
The public domain, in this case, reflects a grade
of public purposes, which is so high that it excludes all
other property relationships. Thus, when property or
resources are in public domain a special administra-
tive title "of intervention" (i.e., a title exercised only
in order to prevent inappropriate use) applies, which
must be considered as a res extra comercium. Property
in the public domain is thus more than a special type
of property - the State exercises a special protection
based on powers (and competences) regulated by
Public Law, whose mandatory focus is to guarantee
the compliance and coherence with the purposes to
which these goods are linked.  
In this system the importance of linking public
domain goods for public utility purposes is clear. This
is reflected in the constitutional jurisprudence, which
has specifically upheld the view that goods in the pub-
lic domain are extra comercium goods, whose destina-
tion must be the public use and satisfy public interest.
For this reason they are subjected to a special legal
regime. 
The classic paradigm for use of public domain
goods is, without doubt, the assignment to a public use
or utility. These are out of the trade, non-susceptible to
private appropriation – the State's administrative title of
intervention guarantees that the only uses of these
resources will be for public purposes satisfying State
scrutiny. There is, therefore, a special legal system of
Administrative Law dedicated to identifying and apply-
ing standards for the legal characteristics of goods in the
public domain such as non-assignability, non-applicabil-
ity, immunity from seizure, etc. But, also, the application
of this regime necessitates the use by the State of differ-
ent means of guardianship and protection for public
domain properties, as compared with the means avail-
able to a private owner when protecting private proper-
ty. This has been pointed out by the Constitutional
Chamber which noted that: 
IV. (....) Characteristics of these goods, are 
non-assignability, non-applicability, immunity from
seizure; they cannot be mortgaged neither can they
be susceptible of obligation in Civil Law and other
administrative action except for injunctions for
recovering the domain. Since they are out of the
trade, these goods cannot besubject to possession.
Although a utilization right can be acquired, no
property right may.143
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However, the prohibition to alienate the public
dominion of the State does not generally exclude its
disposal by means of administrative law - through
concession, lease, grant, authorization, and in general
public or administrative contract. Once the resources
have been delivered by an appropriate legal
mechanism (concession or permit) the holder has a
right of property, except where the authorizing title
stipulates otherwise. For example, fauna is public
domain, but the hunting and fishing permits allow
the complete appropriation of individual specimens,
including their destruction. Also, the concessions of
water, minerals and hydrocarbons allow particular
minerals, water and hydrocarbons to be sold, given,
granted or destroyed. 
The characteristics of non-assignability, non-applica-
bility, and immunity from seizure, which apply to
resources of public domain, cease to apply once
resources such as petroleum, gold or water have been
appropriated by individual users.
3.2.2.5 Open questions 
The consequences of this legal nature (public domain)
for the content (rights and obligations) of ABS agree-
ments still need to be studied. As noted above, this
question of ownership of property is considered to be
almost exclusively a matter of national law. Even in
cases in which property of foreign citizens has been
"nationalized," international law has not generally
contained the authority for other states or interna-
tional bodies to intervene. Consequently, addressing
the rights granted to those who are involved in
prospecting of the materials is a crucial topic. 
Given that users are acquiring these rights (or con-
cluding that they have these rights) every day, the mat-
ter has a high degree of urgency. According to some, for
example, the state concedes, upon permitting any type
of physical access to biological resources, custody of the
material for purposes of research and development.144
What rights would the receiver-user then have?
And especially, what rights to transform it and protect it
– for example, by means of rights of intellectual property
– are taken away (i.e., the source country no longer has
the right to dispense it)? Can it protect the improved
material or an invention stemming from it if they 
contemplate the genetic dedicated component? Can one
isolate and characterize a gene and its function and the
invention be patented with corresponding future uses?
From the point of view of the user, restrictions in the use
of the genetic resource via intellectual property can deter-
mine whether a company decides to bioprospect or not.
What implications must be considered for the
genetic resources of public domain, with regard to the
work of preparing and delivering samples, extracts
and fractions, etc.? Would it be possible (would a
company accept) for a country to require that extracts
and fractions are delivered to the user "in custody" (in
other words, extracted and prepared by the source
country, so that the entire genetic resource remains
the property of the source country)? If so, is there any
limit on future acquisition of these property rights
(physical) by third parties, since they are only granted
in custody? Would this approach alleviate the property
law concern? And if so, would it simply transfer the
problem to another branch of law (for example to
criminal law, which would have to find a basis for
action against those who take and use genetic
resources without any permission)? The restrictions in
the use of the materials must be specified. What is the
degree of restriction on these extracts or fractions that
may practically be imposed?
For example, Casas (speaking of the law of
Colombia) indicates that the applicant for access
should consider the utilization of the genetic resources
as part of the rights that he is applying for, but that
this right of utilization does not transfer a property
interest in the resources, because they have an
unalienable character. Eventually rights on the intel-
lectual intangible property resulting from the investi-
gation and development of the genetic resources are
usually claimed by means of IPRs.145
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144 Casas (2004) suggests that the system should recognize custody rights to the person in physical possession of the samples, which entitles them
to provide PIC and receive benefits.
145 Cfr Casas, 2004.
45
Key Issues for Functional and Operative Certainty in Access Regimes
146 IUCN-Canada, 2005. 
147 It has been said that “a critical element of user certainty in the context of the nature of the rights granted relates to the question of whether addi-
tional permits or permissions will be necessary at later stages in the process of accessing and utilizing genetic resources,” IUCN-Canada, 2005.
Table 3. Laws or regulations restricting uses of the genetic resources147
3.2.3 Avoiding the property-definition problem
One way to address the difficult questions raised by the
creation of this new kind of property right is to avoid
addressing it. ABS issues are addressed contractually by
many countries that have not described the right
granted, but focused on the performances required. As
has been indicated:146
One of the key requirements of user certainty is that
user and the granting or source country share a
mutual understanding of the exact nature of the
rights granted by the ABS agreement. In this connection
it is interesting to note that none of the [national
legislative] measures examined describes or considers
ABS rights from the perspective of the user, by 
stating in effect that the grant of ABS rights entitles
the user to the following.... In general terms, the
nature of the positive rights granted by the 
ABS decision is expressed in terms of limits. Apart
from these, the nature of the grant is somewhat
determinable by considering the activities that are
strictly forbidden unless an ABS right is obtained.
Thus, for example, one possible solution would be to
limit the permit-holder's or contract-holder's claim to
the sample as delivered, or, in legislation simply to assure
the free availability of the genetic material. Although it
does not prevent any user from undertaking modifica-
tion or from applying for IPRs on the modification of
that resource, it at least provides a basis for holding that
only new inventions and novel organisms (obviously
including the genetic component of the organism) can
legally be claimed in this way. 
Type of control/ country/law Example
Restriction on patent or other 
IPR - India/Biodiversity Law
No person shall apply for any form of IPR by whatever name
called in or outside India for any invention based on research or
information on a biological resource obtained from India with-
out the previous approval of the National Biodiversity Authority.
Restriction on transfer of research 
results - India/Biodiversity Law
A separate approval from the National Biodiversity Authority will
be required for any transfer of the results of any research relating
to biological resources occurring in or obtained from India.
Restriction on patent or other 
IPR - African Union/Model Law on
[ABS and other issues] 
No person may apply for Intellectual Property Rights on life
forms.
Restriction on research-related 
cultivation or multiplication –
Malaysia/Access Agreement 
The Access Agreement prohibits the researcher to germinate,
propagate, breed or cultivate any biological resources without
prior approval of the Sarawak Council. 
Restriction on patent or other IPR –
Malaysia/Access Agreement
The researcher shall not file any applications for patents, either
inside or outside Sarawak, without the prior concurrence in writ-
ing of the Council.
Restriction on transfer of resources –
Bhutan/Biodiversity Act
Applicant shall not transfer the resources to any Third Party
without the authorization of the Competent Authority.
One of the harshest criticisms of the legal systems of
ABS comes from the sectors of basic research (universi-
ties and other research centers). From the earliest days of
the CBD, these have considered that the regulations of
ABS tend to impose requisites difficult to fulfill; they do
not distinguish clearly between research done with com-
mercial intentions and that without commercial purpos-
es. They have complained that the Convention does not
adequately recognize the intrinsic advantages of basic
research and its contribution to the conservation and the
sustainable use of biodiversity.149
A study undertaken by Columbia University,150
concludes that: 
... hindrance to access to genetic resources is the use of
same standards in commercial and non-commercial
research.... access regulations have become increasingly
restrictive and commercially-oriented. Hence a cum-
bersome, unnecessarily strict application process is
imposed on what is considered basic, not for profit
research. This basic scientific investigation is required
to understand natural processes and almost invariably
precedes commercial research ....
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In this sense, any attempt to control post-access activities
relating to the genetic resources can be seen as a way of
applying "property-like" rights to those resources, with-
out (or in support of) creating new property rights. Table
3 provides a few examples of this type of provisions.
148 This book does not consider the impact of variations among national decisions on this point. (See, Book 6 of this Series, Young et al., Covering
Access.)
149 See Grajal, 1999.
150 Columbia University, op. cit.
3.2.4 Recommendations
It appears that all countries have the need to address
property rights issues in some way.148 While no exter-
nal source can provide a model or complete guide to a
country in this very individualized issue, a few clear
recommendations arise: 
• First, the countries should recognize the difficulties
inherent in any attempt to establish property rights
over genetic information, but should also be aware
of the problems that arise from trying to apply tra-
ditional property regimes in this context. Obstacles
such as the difficulty in identifying the property,
and in exercising physical control over it, as well as
its transnational character, have proven insur-
mountable, up to now. The exercise of traditional
attributes of property rights is not always effective-
ly applicable in the case of genetic resources.
• Second, in spite of the difficulty, it seems clear
that property rights to genetic material should be
specified in each country in conformity with the
legal system established by its Constitution. The
clarification of the relation between property
rights over biological resources and genetic
resources would contribute to greater legal cer-
tainty in all transactions relating to both kinds of
resources.
• Finally, the rights granted to the applicant and
the reach of the concept of public domain,
should be clarified to avoid uncertainty regarding
prohibitions and restrictions on future uses to be
carried out by users.
3.3 Differentiating between basic and commercial research 
Several laws have sought to address these concerns, by
establishing different regulations for research-related
access, than for other types of use.151 For purposes of
legal certainty, however, it is important to note several
key concerns for countries seeking to make this distinc-
tion. First, the flexibility that some countries have estab-
lished for basic research requires the designation of clear
limits between the cases of access for commercial gain,
and access for basic non-commercial purposes. Second,
however, it is necessary to guarantee that the rights of
the provider will be protected in the case that a commer-
cially valuable result is obtained from an activity initial-
ly considered as basic research. Additionally, the user
should have certainty that eventually it will be possible
to seek commercial results.152
There is significant agreement in many countries
and institutions that the process of access for basic
research should be simpler, but subject to later negotia-
tions in the case of the commercialization of the results
of the research based on the genetic resources.153 This
concept of subsequent negotiation is needed to balance
past experience, where basic research has resulted in
products on the market, without any ABS compliance
or benefit sharing. This is especially so in the case of
biotechnology research that requires a strong compo-
nent of basic science. Both researchers and source coun-
tries share an important consensus with respect to the
difficulties in establishing a clear frontier in this area.154
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151 Correa (2000) on a broader comment on ABS laws mentions: “The Convention applies to all types of genetic resources, including food and
agriculture. No difference is made with respect to the treatment to be given to different sectors of biodiversity. The broad scope and the gener-
ality of the regulation on genetic resources is problematic. The conditions and use of animal, plant, microbial, aquatic or marine resources vary
considerably. As a result, the practices of exchange and appropriation of such resources also differ, depending on the distribution and availabil-
ity of the resources, the difficulty or ease to reproduce them, and the existence or not of markets for their exchange, among other factors.”  
152 Rosenthal (unpublished) indicates: “It may also be useful to consider a two phase approach to preserve elements of both the freedom to aca-
demic research and the flexibility to pursue industrial development of potential discoveries, while offering security to providers.” 
153 Fernández (2005) comments: “A basic implication of the valuation problem is that any effort to fully contract the terms and conditions of benefit
sharing is likely to be faced with a wide variety of difficulties, from non-commercial projects that will unexpected turn commercial at an unknown
point in the future to commercial ventures in which it will be extremely difficult to assess the value of the collection of species to be prospected.
Therefore, there is a need for better information on the actual potential of genetic resources. If contracting is forced to take place fully at the outset,
the value negotiated will be highly speculative and could end up being too low or the contract will not be signed.” 
154 Cf. Carrizosa et al., (eds) 2004. Dross and Wolff (2005) indicate: “A more general question is whether scientific and commercial research should be differen-
tiated. While this is desirable to foster scientific research, the differentiation is not always obvious. Often scientific research later leads to commercialisation.”
A broader analysis of "research exceptions" provisions
suggests a few common characteristics. For example,
they define in a general manner, usually negatively
(e.g., activities without commercial intent), the mean-
ing they attach to basic research, and so far, they do
not include criteria that would permit the user to
know what actions, conditions or situations cause the
(non-commercial) character of the investigation to
change.
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155 See Chile, ABS Draft Law which would be applicable only to commercial research.
156 See Carrizosa et al., 2004; Dross and Wolff, “New Elements,” op. cit; and Columbia University, 1999.
157 Names and citations of relevant laws are available in Cabrera Medaglia, 2004, A Comparative Analysis... .
Country157 Provision
Philippines In accordance to the Wildlife Law, bioprospecting is limited to research with commercial purposes. Research with
non-commercial purposes does not require the signature of a Commercial Research Agreement (CRADA). The
authorization of scientific research is done by means of a gratuitous (no fee) permit. "Scientific research" is not defined
but "bioprospecting" is defined as research, collection and utilization of biological and genetic resources for purpose
of applying knowledge derived solely for commercial purposes.
Costa Rica Access for basic research is defined as "Activities directed at investigation, examination, classification or increase of
existing knowledge over biological resources or their genetic or biochemical characteristics without immediate
interest in commercializing its results." Some (few) requisites do not apply for basic research (e.g., unlike in other
ABS situations, in the case of basic research, it is not mandatory to share up to 10% of the research budget with
the providers of the genetic resources). 
Brazil The Council of Genetic Patrimony dispenses with some requirements (no contract for utilization of genetic
resources is signed) and undergoes fast tracking, in which special authorizations are issued to domestic academic
institutions that encompass a group of projects. Scientific Research is defined as using genetic resources with no eco-
nomic purpose. Access for non-commercial purposes is considered to "contribute to the advance of knowledge of
biodiversity of the country and not present previously identified potential for economic use as with the activities of
bioprospecting or technological development."
Australia The relevant law covers both commercial and non-commercial access. However, a benefit-sharing 
agreement is required for any applicant for a permit for access to biological resources for commercial purposes
or potential commercial purposes. 
Malaysia
(Sarawak)
According to the amended regulations of the Sarawak Access, Collection and Research, the regulations exclude a
study, experiment, test or examination carried out within Sarawak, of biological resources in connection with any
educational course or syllabus conducted by an approved institution which does not or is not intended to lead to
development and commercialization of the aforesaid properties, values and qualities.
Table 4. Select countries which differentiate commercial and basic ABS research
3.3.1 Legislative approaches
This flexibility of regulation for non-commercial activities has been considered in the legislation in draft laws of 
various countries,155 as presented in the following chart.156
Note: Other countries or regions have intentionally decided not to make any distinction between non-commercial and commercial
research (e.g., Andean Countries, Venezuela, India).
To facilitate access to genetic resources for basic
research, it has been suggested158 that countries estab-
lish a "two track" application process, wherein any
access applicant would be able to choose between
either one of the two tracks. Under this system, the
user/applicant would define his own intentions,
avoiding the need to infer them from the project
description or other criteria. Some criteria that can be
utilized to differentiate between both types of research
could include:159
• Whether an initial direct and immediate purpose
exists to take to the market a resultant product of
the research;160
• Whether research results will be transferred to
third parties for a price;
• Whether the researcher or related entity applies
for intellectual property rights (demonstrating an
intention to commercialize the results).
In any case, the design of the legal framework will be
functional if accompanied by mechanisms that allow
the source country:
a) to control the use (in the country where the
research and development will take place); 
b) to verify the later commercial use; and 
c) to claim benefits, including the possibility of
gaining access to justice in the user country.
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158 Columbia University, 1999.
159 The principles for accessing genetic resources, the treatment of intellectual property and the sharing of benefits associated with International
Cooperative Biodiversity Groups-sponsored research indicate: “Where national governments do not have clear regulations to guide informed
consent procedures, activities should follow a two phase approach to distinguish basic and commercial research. Research intended primarily
for publication including collecting and analyzing biodiversity, as well as bioassay and chemistry work, may be considered basic research. If at
any time, researchers intend to file a patent application based on this work or send a sample for testing to an industrial partner, the research
enters the commercial realm and must follow all the requisites,” available in www.fic.nih.gov 
160 The Principles on Access to Genetic Resources of the Botanical Gardens, defines commercialization as “applying for, obtaining or transferring
intellectual property rights or other tangible or intangible rights by the sale or licence or in any other manner commencement of product devel-
opment, conducting market research, and seeking pre-market approval and/or the sale of any resulting product.”
3.3.2 Recommendations
A few recommendations can be drawn from this
analysis, to aid countries that have decided to include
a research/non-commercial use distinction:
• Countries should establish a list of criteria that,
prima facie, permits the differentiation between
basic and commercial research, recognizing that it
is not always easy to establish the boundary
between the two.
• Criteria should be established to provide a basis
for determining when "basic research" turns into
commercial research or utilization.
• Flexibility in the treatment of access that is
sought for scientific ends has to be seen also in
the context of an integral regulatory system of
ABS where the user countries establish measures
for the later control of the commercial use of the
genetic resources which allows the country of ori-
gin to know if commercial use exists and to pro-
ceed to exercise the rights in the foreign jurisdic-
tion, in the case that the commercialization does
not comply with the conditions of access.
Administrative procedures relating to PIC in the ABS
context vary from country to country. Based on analysis
of these, several principal difficulties can be cited:164
• Lack of clarity regarding legislation and applica-
ble procedures. When the legislation exists, it is
not clear what is the participation of the different
departments and who has the right to finally
authorize the access request. 
• Insufficient information about who should solicit
the PIC and regarding when the access procedure
has included all interested parties.165
• Lack of institutional and technical capacity for
resolving the request for PIC at the legal, admin-
istrative and technical levels. This lack of capacity
on occasion translates into lack of confidence. 
• Conflicts between stakeholders' interests and
expectations. Effective implementation of PIC
can be hampered by different and, at times,
incompatible interests and expectations amongst
various stakeholders.
A recent study166 indicates that "questions frequently
exist about how to convey the information needed to
make informed decisions and about how, when and
from whom consent should be obtained. The answers
to these critical questions often differ according to the
precise ABS issue and community involved."167
Problems relating to PIC have been identified across a
wide range of parties and stakeholders whose concerns
can probably best be satisfied by cooperation. The next
section describes work by a user-oriented association,
suggesting some issues which can be addressed, at least
in part, by national legislation of the source country. 
From the viewpoint of legal certainty, it is indispensable
to address the issue of Prior Informed Consent (PIC).
Despite its very simple description, PIC has been iden-
tified as one of the most complex and difficult aspects
for the user seeking to obtain access to genetic resources.
In fact, some of the strongest criticisms of the ABS systems
have related to the difficulties of obtaining the PIC in
practice.161 In its practical analysis of national implementa-
tion, the study on the Pacific Rim Countries identified the
PIC procedures as one of the major shortcomings.162
As noted above, despite all of the attention, PIC
is not a new concept. Not only does the concept of
"informed consent" form the basis of all contract law,
it is also specifically included in several international
instruments. In contrast to other convention-based
applications of PIC (medical treatment, transboundary
movements of chemicals or toxic wastes), the prior
informed consent within the context of the CBD is
also intended to act as a guarantee of equitable 
benefit sharing and therefore plays a contractual as
well as regulatory role.163 PIC difficulties, like most
other issues in this book, find their basis in the basic
functionality problems of the ABS concept, rather
than in the national legislation itself.
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161 See Lange, 2005; and Rosenthal, unpublished.
162 Carrizosa et al., 2004. 
163 Cf. Hirakuri and Toben, 2005.
164 See cases studies on PIC in Perault, 2006.
165 For example, Decision 16/V of the V COP indicated that access to traditional knowledge should be subject to prior informed consent or prior
approval from the holders of such knowledge. 
166 See Perault, 2006.
167 In this connection, the IUCN-Canada study concludes that to “... enhance user certainty appears to be through clarity, including clarification
of key elements of the application process such as: (i) the rights and duties of National Competent Authorities, (ii) the relationship between
ABS applications and other approval processes, (iii) milestones and the timing of the various steps in the process, (iv) the extent to which the
CND may request additional information and performances, (v) the bases on which the decision will be made, (vi) rights of appeal, and (vii)
the objective factor that will determine whether an applicant is exempt from the need to obtain ABS permits.  Perhaps the most important way
to maximize certainty is to clarify the legal status of the rights granted whether it is a property right or vested interest. A user can determine
what it can legitimately expect, whether it is worth his investment and what procedures and protections of law apply.” IUCN-Canada, 2005.
3.4  Prior informed consent (PIC): making it operative and certain 
3.4.1 National PIC measures
3.4.1.1 Insight into PIC from user countries
Recently, the government of Japan, in the course of
developing guidelines for its users of genetic resources,168
identified several practical issues of concern, which are
usually not easily answered under the PIC laws and
practices of source countries:
• Whether it is necessary to obtain PIC once again
for those genetic resources that had been obtained
before the CBD entered into force ( 29 December
1993);
• What rights, if any, the user has when a number of
months have passed since a PIC application was
made, but the authorities have not informed
whether or not the permission has been granted;
• How to verify that PIC has been obtained in a case
where the genetic resources are provided indirect-
ly via a commercial intermediary;
• Whether it is necessary to obtain PIC when acquir-
ing genetic resources from culture collections (ex-
situ collections of microbial resources, for example);
• What rules apply in the case of acquisition for non-
genetic-resource purposes (for example: plants
obtained for ornamental purposes), which are later
found to possess some molecule of commercial
interest (i.e., is it mandatory to obtain PIC from
the country where the species have been taken?)169
Some of these points may not be answerable or resolv-
able through source-country legislation at all, but
many of them may be. 
3.4.1.2 Bonn Guidelines: recommendations for
PIC implementation
Likewise, the Bonn Guidelines recognize PIC as an
important element through which the ABS process can
be catalyzed and legitimized.170 As noted by IUCN, it
provides "a first step in promoting effectiveness and
efficiency in the application of laws and regulations
governing access and use of genetic resources in 
identifying and assigning clear functions, competences
and roles to the National Competent Authority on
access to genetic resources and benefit sharing;"171
however, choosing a focal point is a relatively simple
action (unless it has political implications) and offers
no expectation of a solution to the problems of nation-
al implementation or user certainty. In any case, PIC 
procedures must be clearly outlined in a way that
reduces time and transaction costs for bioprospectors. 
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3.5 Conclusions: pathways to effective legislation in source countries
Obviously, the problem of source-country legislation is
far from solved, even though source countries have been
attempting to develop effective ABS regimes since 1992. 
The case of the Philippines is quite illustrative of
the issues being addressed in this paper. The
Philippines has been a pioneer in ABS. In 1995, it was
the first country after the entry into force of the CBD
to regulate ABS in great detail with the development
and implementation of Executive Order 247.172 At the
168 Ministry of Trade and Industry (METI), 2005. The Japanese Guidelines present principles set forth in the CBD for PIC; explanatory notes on
the meaning of them; “points to note” including information on entities issuing PIC, procedures for obtaining PIC; etc.. Other Guideline doc-
uments have been put forward. See also Bioprospecting Guidelines for BIO members, developed by the Biotechnology Industry Association of
the USA (see www.bio.org) and the approach found in the Access and Benefit Sharing. Good Practice for Academic Research on Genetic
Resources, Swiss Academy of Sciences, Switzerland, 2006.
169 Similarly, Perault (2006) mentions five enabling conditions for PIC at the international, national, local and project levels, including: under-
standing and recognition of property rights, including community based property rights; community participation in decision making; build-
ing capacities for local communities to engage efficiently in PIC processes, including legal and technical capacities; effective mechanisms for
resolving disputes and promoting compliance, etc.
170 See Bonn Guidelines, para. 24-40.
171 Cfr IUCN, position paper on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing, submitted at the Seventh Meeting of the Conference of the
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Curitiba, Brazil, 20-31March 2006 (contact, Rojas, M.).
172 Executive Order 247 on Access to Genetic Resources is entitled “Prescribing Guidelines and Establishing a Regulatory Framework for the Prospecting
of Biological and Genetic Resources, their By-products and Derivatives, for Scientific and Commercial Purposes and for Other Purposes.”
same time, it has been one of the few countries to
carry out a full review and modification of its legal
framework. It adopted new legislation (the Wildlife
Resources Conservation and Protection Act) in 2001,
which contains a few general provisions on ABS and
has developed new implementing guidelines on bio-
prospecting.173 This means that it has taken more than
10 years174 to revise a regulation that was widely 
considered as complex, bureaucratic and restrictive.
This is not an isolated case; in the Mexican context
(where the author has direct experience), consensus
building in the Congress is very difficult to achieve.
This means that once a problematic law is passed, it
will be very difficult to change, especially if that
change implies a full review or a whole change of
direction. 
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173 Benavidez, 2004, “The Challenges...”.
174 This figure should not be dramatically surprising. In a related documented case of capacity development in a developing country, it took more
than 10 years for Mexico to fully understand its obligations and to play a full role in the workings of CITES. See Arroyo-Quiroz, 2005.
Even the most basic elements of the national access
legislation frameworks present difficult challenges.
Access legislation embodies many kinds of action and
awareness, most especially awareness of what is done
with resources once they have been accessed (obtained
with permission to use). According to Carrizosa et al.,
the monitoring of bioprospecting agreements is one of
the most difficult, expensive and resource consuming
tasks currently undertaken in ABS. Currently, none of
the countries studied has created an effective and
functional monitoring system, whether applicable at
national level or as applied to users outside of the
source country's borders, given the jurisdictional and
other problems with any attempt to follow the uses of
genetic resources, or to exchange information about
them.177
The problem with monitoring and compliance is
considered to exist on two levels:178 direct monitoring
(the technical problems relating to all monitoring,
inspection and verification at national levels) and
transboundary monitoring after the genetic resources
This chapter seeks to address the legal problems for
source countries, regarding the enforcement of their
laws on ABS. These problems have been noted across
a wide range of commentators, with varying sugges-
tions, ranging from increasing penalties and controls
on specimen collection to mandating greater involve-
ment by user countries, to developing incentives
which are sufficient to promote compliance without
major enforcement actions. This chapter also raises
another possible avenue for improving enforcement -
altering the legal basis of the user's action through
"reciprocity" provisions. This idea links to the discus-
sion of incentives, under which more favorable
(streamlined or less expensive) procedures would be
available to users who make such a commitment. As
noted below, this idea may have some limited impli-
cations from international trade.
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175 Young, 2006.  
176 Id. and see Rosenthal, unpublished.
177 Carrizosa et al., 2004.
178 Cf. Ogolla, 2005.
Enforcement, Tracking, and the Need 
for Incentives and Other Approaches4
4.1 Preliminary considerations - inefficacy of mandatory measures 
Before analyzing the issue of incentives to promote
compliance with the ABS procedures, some preliminary
considerations are necessary. It has been noted that the
current ABS situation often penalizes those who want
to comply with ABS laws.175 ABS initiatives that have
become known to the public have come under the
attack of different groups that have been opposed to
them, under the concept of biopiracy, even where the
applicant took every available measure to comply with
national ABS requirements.176
Detection of non-compliance is also difficult, but
for different reasons. Monitoring and enforcement,
for example, are problematic because the material in
question can often be difficult to identify, consisting of
things such as seeds, water samples or micro-organisms.
Authorities have no means of assessing what the 
samples might contain and what uses they might be
put to. Even when identified their provenance cannot
often be proven. Compounding this problem is the
fact that the collection of material for one purpose
might be quite legitimate while collection of the same
material for a different purpose might be an offence. 
4.2 Controlling and monitoring the utilization of genetic resources
The main enforcement problems with observance of
ABS regulations are posed by the possibility of non-
compliance with the provider countries' legislative
provisions or with provisions in access contracts. In
large measure, these issues arise outside of the source
country's territorial jurisdiction. 
Obviously, in a transboundary system180 the most
significant problems arise where both countries are
involved on the administrative and/or legal levels.
Numerous authors have noted that the near total lack
of measures by user countries may have had the great-
est influence on the decision to commence the nego-
tiations for an International Regime. In this regard, it
has been said that: 
In effect, any international regime will require a coope-
rative effort between the providers and users of genetic
resources and traditional knowledge and will require
that both take actions to mutually support the common
objectives of the CBD relating to fair and equitable
benefit-sharing.181
The ability of the provider countries to enforce their
legal requirements will largely depend on legal mech-
anisms in foreign jurisdictions. The source country,
however, is not released from the need to adopt both
primary measures and enforcement-based mecha-
nisms such as reporting and rights to annul or termi-
nate the contract. Thus, although there is a strong
impetus to compel developed countries to adopt "user
measures," there is also a need for source countries'
have left the country (where users' facilities are locat-
ed in other countries). This section will begin by
addressing direct monitoring and oversight provisions,
and then consider what provisions and processes 
source countries may use to maximize oversight, 
awareness and legal authority when the genetic
resources are outside of their borders. The next 
section (4.3) will discuss particular approaches and
case examples in greater detail.
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179 Cfr Cabrera Medaglia, 2004, A Comparative Analysis.... Cfr Cabrera Medaglia, 2004, “Access and Benefit Sharing in Costa Rica...”. 
180 As noted above, the CBD concept of ABS is based on the situation of a user from one country who utilizes genetic resources from another coun-
try.
181 Barber et al., 2003. 
4.2.1 Direct national monitoring and oversight
Even in areas where territorial jurisdiction is clear,
experience has generally shown that governments have
difficulty in monitoring bioprospecting activities, due
to the limited resources available. Under article 15,
source country monitoring, oversight and enforce-
ment are all seen to arise out of two sources: 
(i) legal compliance with the procedures for obtain-
ing a right of access (discussed above under the
heading "Prior Informed Consent"), and 
(ii) the terms of the access agreement or permit
(Mutually Agreed Terms) and/or national legisla-
tion regarding the activities, standards and limita-
tions relevant to obtaining and using genetic
resources of the source country.
In addition, of course, all countries have broader
rights to adopt legislation, and compliance with
national legislation itself (both ABS and other legisla-
tion) is really the primary rule of ABS oversight. This
section, however, focuses only on ABS laws and their
implementation. 
In most national access laws the primary over-
sight measures are based on periodic reporting, to
evaluate compliance with access conditions. This is
the main mechanism used to verify compliance, but
its effectiveness is limited. Other schemes such as the
use of identification codes for samples, access to
research lab notes, etc., have been used, for example,
by the National Biodiversity Institute in Costa Rica, as
discussed below.179 
4.2.2 Facilitating/mandating transboundary monitoring and oversight
Up to now, discussion of oversight and enforcement
has generally focused on the contents of ABS con-
tracts. They assume that if the contracts exist and are
agreed by user and provider, enforcement under con-
tract law is inevitable. The primary challenge, and
principal problem, for source countries is rooted in
the difficulties of using contractual instruments as
enforcement tools, where the basic rules and subject of
the contract are unclear.184 In essence, the objective in
these negotiations is to obtain sufficient guarantees on
the use of the genetic resources, and compliance with
reporting and data-sharing requirements, that the
country's interest will be protected.185 
This suggests that further development of ABS leg-
islation (including development at the international
level) will need to focus on those points of ABS imple-
mentation that are not enforceable under contract law -
whether they are unclear, ambiguous, unfair, ineffective
or impractical. In the long run, mechanisms, measures
access legislation to be designed to provide that
"mutual support." 
There are numerous provisions that appear to be
necessary at the source-country level, to strengthen
the country's position with regard to enforcement
outside its territorial boundaries. In general, these
provisions include clear statements about what may or
may not be done with resources that have originated
from the country, regardless of where those activities
take place. In addition, the country should adopt leg-
islation stating that the terms of any access arrange-
ment (or of utilization of genetic resources without
ABS compliance) shall require regular reporting and
milestones (as noted in chapter 3, above). Most impor-
tant, however, the law must authorize the national gov-
ernment to take whatever measures possible to over-
see, inspect and confirm that utilization of genetic
resources complies with national ABS law. This
should include giving the government the power to
call on officials from other countries, and other 
individuals, to take these actions, if necessary. 
In the majority of ABS contracts, periodic
reports form the primary tool to secure the correct use
of the resources provided.  Casas suggests other mech-
anisms that could be developed including:182
Administrative and legal mechanisms to fully inve-
stigate demands for violation of ABS ..., in particu-
lar, facilitating access to justice for developing
Countries of Origin [where resources were] acquired
by deception or through a failure to fully disclose the
commercial motive behind the acquisition or based
upon a transaction deemed to be exploitative. 
In this connection, it is important to remember that
monitoring and oversight apply far beyond the stage of
commercial development. Provider countries must also
seek mechanisms to tie access to user standards and
measures during the phases of use, research and devel-
opment, patenting of products and processes, etc. - that
is, all stages after initial acquisition of the resource.183
The legal need for both the power and the ability
to oversee and monitor may tie in with the idea of a
"certificate of origin/source/legal provenance," which
has been raised in international ABS discussions. Such
an instrument would be of interest, providing that it is
able to improve transparency and traceability. It has also
been suggested that such a mechanism might simplify
user-country measures, if it can provide guarantees that
the provider country's legal requirements have been
complied with. 
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183 Fernandez Ugalde, 2005. 
184 However, as mentioned earlier, the assumption that ABS (creation, execution, implementation, oversight and compliance with ABS agreements)
would be addressed by contracts and governed by national contract law is not necessarily correct. This statement is also valid for the assumption
that ABS contracts can provide the legal means to monitor the use of the GR and to enforce the terms and conditions of the permits, see Young,
2004, “Legal Issues....” 
185 Many issues relating to the negotiation of ABS contracts are addressed in Book 4 of this Series, Bhatti et al., Contracting for ABS.
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4.2.3 Contractual mechanisms
4.2.4 Case study: tracking and monitoring at INBio
In the majority of cases, the only mechanisms avail-
able to provider countries for monitoring the utiliza-
tion of genetic resources are the reports of the user.
Experience has indicated some good practices and case
studies which have proven effective.186
One useful case study is the manner in which
Costa Rico's INBio addresses the transfer of resources
for bioprospecting. In general, material is collected in
the field under a permit system with separate permits
for export and domestic use. A standard agreement
applies to taxonomic research while unique legal
agreements are developed for bioprospecting research.
4.2.4.1 External transfers for bioprospecting
All material leaving INBio's Bioprospecting Unit is
labeled with a barcode and identification number.
INBio uses legal and contractual mechanisms for the
tracking of the genetic resources as follows:
1. Access is limited in time and quantity. Any transfer
to a third party of sample is made using a material
transfer agreement (MTA) or under a collaborative
research agreement (with companies, research insti-
tutions, etc.). INBio agrees to transfer the materials
specified in detail in the annex of the MTA or the
contract.
2. The recipient may transfer the material only with
prior written authorization. The terms and condi-
tions of the original MTA shall apply equally to
these third parties. A letter with the following word-
ing is usually required to accompany all transfers:
This material has been received under a Material
Transfer Agreement which includes terms and
conditions for use by Third Parties.
3. The recipient shall assign a unique identification
number to each of the materials obtained and to the
resulting materials from the research that will ensure
traceability.
4. Usually the recipient is obligated by the contract to
maintain complete and accurate internal written
records and reporting systems so as to keep track of
all the materials and any research and/or develop-
ment activities.
5. The recipient has the duty to allow INBio upon
request to audit and/or inspect such records and
reporting systems from time to time and to make
such changes in such reporting systems as INBio
may reasonably request to ensure the accurate
tracking of all materials.
6. INBio may have access to the lab notes on INBio
material.
7. The recipient shall submit periodical reports to
INBio on materials, stage of the research, IPR,
research results, etc.
8. The monitoring of uses is provided by the
Bioprospecting Unit. There is no Department or
special personnel dedicated to the monitoring of
contracts; it is done by the current scientific and
technical personnel in charge of other bioprospect-
ing tasks.
4.2.4.2 External transfers for biodiversity inventory
In general, all the types of samples located in INBio's
collection (existing inventory) can be transferred to a
third party, using an MTA and only for basic non-
commercial research. These transfers occur mostly in
the context of taxonomic research which does not
involve access to reproducible genetic resources.
Transfers are made only to qualified collaborators.
Each specimen has a bar code written in the sample
and instruments that are negotiated and developed at the
national level, but relate to transboundary situations,
provide a clear indication of some areas in which cross
border cooperation and legislative support are essential. 
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186 For instance the agreement can make clear who will cover the cost. A specific contribution to the payment of the cost of the dispute mechanisms
may be considered. Additional mechanisms such as insurance provisions in case of disputes may be explored, by which the insurance institution
will pay for the cost of the process. 
As noted above, there are many virtually unsolvable 
problems that prevent source-country legislation – in
the absence of necessary provisions in the user country –
from functioning to mandate, oversee and ensure bene-
fit sharing. Even if sufficient provisions are adopted by
the source country, the costs and demands of oversight
of a mandatory system may prevent functionality. 
Some commenters feel that this situation can only be
addressed by focusing on the establishment of a regime
that encourages compliance rather than one that seeks to
force it through monitoring and enforcement actions. The
relatively limited enforcement capacity of most source
country ABS authorities does not provide a sufficient
threat of penalty. Consequently, the threat of being 
detected breaking the ABS laws does not constitute an
incentive to comply. Similarly, the existing system's non-
enforcement motivations are minimal. The threat of 
public exposure does not always have a sufficient impact to
encourage compliance, and compliance does not always
prevent claims of biopiracy.189 Consequently, it seems
essential to develop incentives and other elements that give
the user a motivation to comply with ABS requirements.190
As Tvedt191 pointed out:
One gap in the present benefit-sharing situation is the
lack of clear incentives for researchers and industry to
comply with the benefits-sharing obligation. Industry
does not have much to achieve or gain by complying
form or MTA and monitoring is done through 1)
reports from the recipient and 2) a requirement for
the recipient to cite the barcode number of any spec-
imens used in publications.187 
4.2.4.3 Costs of tracking resources through INBio
One frequent concern is the cost of this kind of system.
The facilities for bar-coding, and the time and expense
necessary to create a collection/inventory of national
specimens cannot be denied. However, these activities
are useful far beyond the scope of ABS. For example,
the database and barcode system can be thought to
effectively enable tracking; however, the purpose of the
system is not primarily for tracking, but rather to facil-
itate data-control - to associate taxonomic use and
other information with the actual material in the col-
lection, to facilitate biodiversity research. Hence, the
costs associated with tracking are difficult to separate
from the wider research information management 
system. No cost estimate is available for compiling or
analyzing reports from recipients on material used in
taxonomic or bioprospecting research projects.
4.2.4.4 Overall analysis: practical aspects of
INBio's tracking system
INBio's practices for labeling biological material and
tracking uses of the material within and outside Costa
Rica show that it is feasible to label even individual
insects given sufficient resources. INBio also databas-
es agreements relating to collection and use of speci-
mens including MAT. 
4.2.4.5 Legislation where there is less infrastructure
For many countries, the experience of Costa Rica,
while useful and interesting, is not practical, given
that they do not have the financial and technical
resources to replicate it. Legislative efforts in these
countries focus on facilitating compliance with con-
tracts and the access to justice in their jurisdiction as
demonstrated by a new draft ABS law, proposed in
the Seychelles,188 one element of which is discussed in
part 4.6, below.
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187 In this connection, it is noted that researchers at INBio do not routinely record publications citing INBio specimen numbers. 
188 The report of the consultants who wrote this draft law is available from IPGRI. See Lettington and Dogley, 2006. Note: as of last report, this
bill has not been approved by the Government of the Seychelles. It is offered as an example of one approach to some of the issues discussed
below, but not as a political statement, nor as a “best practice,” nor as a recommendation that the draft be adopted.
189 See Young, 2006. See also Lettington and Dogley, 2006.
190 An additional discussion of this issue, from the perspective of user and user countries, is included in Book 2 of this Series, Tvedt and Young, Beyond Access.
191 Tvedt, 2006.
4.3 Source-based incentives for compliance
with the benefit-sharing obligation in the CBD. 
The success of patent law partly rests in the fact that the
patentee has the very clear interest in enforcing the
patent upon all other commercial users of the invention.
It is in the interest of the private party that the others
comply with the regulations. Thus, the incentive structu-
re in the patent system brings economic benefits to the
patentee and thus captures the value of his contribution
to the state of the art. Thus, one topic...... to address is
how to establish a sufficient level of incentives for indu-
stry to share a fair and equitable part of the benefits ari-
sing from the use of genetic resources. 
In a situation where there are no effective incentives
in place, the need for effective enforcement mechanisms
increases. If it is not in the interest of the private party to
comply with a legal requirement, there is a need for legal
tools to enforce that legislation. Due to the extra-territo-
rial gap described above, there is a lack of effective enfor-
cement mechanisms in the area of benefit-sharing.
....Certificates and disclosure requirements are often
mentioned in the context of incentives and enforcement.
In summary, as Young suggests:192 "There are basic
indicators of the need for this [to create incentives].
First is the pressure for enforcement and the difficul-
ties in actually enforcing ABS. It is not simple for any
country to oversee or even know about its ABS activ-
ities. Often the only way of knowing whether genetic
resources are being used would be to have access to
private laboratories and files. Second, it is generally
noted that any formal negotiation of ABS agreements
increases the user's risk of being sued. From this per-
spective there is a very strong disincentive to engage in
formal ABS compliance. What is needed is a business
case for ABS compliance - a carefully reasoned, com-
mercially realistic evaluation of the reasons that ABS
is good for business. Presently there are relatively few
such reasons." 
The use of market mechanisms has been suggest-
ed as one way of promoting compliance with access
requirements. For the most part, these measures are
dependent on user country measures, which are
strongly advocated by other authors. However, one
critical question in these discussions will be how source
countries' legislative systems can promote and inte-
grate with such incentives. Measures such as
Certification Systems and voluntary codes of conduct
are important, but really only effective if they are
adopted by user country first, rather than unilaterally
by the provider. Hence only a brief summary of these
issues is appropriate. 
It has been suggested that a system for certifica-
tion of bioprospecting activities could be a way of
encouraging companies to comply with the laws of
ABS and, in general, with better practices in this mat-
ter. Formal certification systems depend on the cre-
ation of clear, objective standards, and then the cre-
ation of administrative mechanisms for verification of
the compliance with the standards. If the certification
is sufficiently "leakproof" and accepted by consumers,
it would allow the consumer to differentiate the final
product and consequently to favor the product by
means of his purchase. Currently, these types of sys-
tems are being developed and applied in cases of for-
est and organic products.
A study into the possibilities of establishing a sys-
tem of certification for bioprospecting determined
that "At least in theory a bioprospecting certification
system would be feasible to create. This conclusion
relies on the realization that certification is a tool that
has already been applied to a wide range of situations.
There is nothing to suggest that certification could
not be applied to bioprospecting activities....
Notwithstanding this general conclusion, outstanding
issues, such as cost and demand, make it difficult to
definitely say whether a bioprospecting certification
system would be feasible to create and operate in prac-
tice. These outstanding issues need to be reviewed
more closely in any subsequent exploratory work
undertaken in the future."193 The study concluded
that unlike other natural resources addressed by other
certification systems, genetic resources do not circu-
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late in the consumer economy. Where they do, it is
not necessarily in a way where consumers could easily
distinguish whether the products embodying them
are coming from a certified source without a label or
logo. Furthermore, even with a label or logo, there
may be no viable mechanism to pass on and capture
the cost as with, for example, marine, ornamentals or
fairly traded agricultural commodities.194 For these
reasons, a market-based certification system appears
difficult to develop.195
Another interesting development is the promo-
tion of voluntary measures,196 such as Codes of
Conduct, principles and guidelines that may be of
value, at least in a relative sense, especially given the
previously mentioned problems related to access to
justice, monitoring and observance. Basically these
codes seek to encourage adherents to comply with
legal standards and good practices. However, these
instruments can be ineffective if not accompanied by
some incentive to use them.
For instance, the Japanese Guidelines (described
above) offer a concrete first step toward effective user
measures, by including a commitment from the
Japanese Government, stating that if a user complies
with all these guidelines and still encounters claims of
misappropriation, unauthorized access or biopiracy,
the Japanese Government will utilize diplomatic and
informal means to seek a solution to the problem.
This assurance of user-country assistance in resolving
ABS-related claims offers real value to the user com-
panies and may become a primary incentive encour-
aging companies to comply with these voluntary
guidelines. Such examples are not common, however. 
Finally, incentives for compliance have not been iden-
tified in any of the ABS legislation that has been
adopted to date. For source countries, the issue of
incentives must focus on matters within their control,
and in which they can provide some benefit. As one
example,197 the country might post the names of com-
panies that have complied with good ABS practices
and legislation. 
Other benefits that the source country can offer
as positive incentives to promote ABS compliance
could include faster processes of approval, lower fees
and other expedited administrative processes, where
there is compliance with the ABS laws. Another pos-
sibility is the payment of reduced fees in IPR applica-
tions and approval processes if/when the user seeks to
patent his innovation in the source country. This
option might be applied to all users, even where their 
product is based on genetic resources acquired from
some other source (another user, an ex-situ collection,
a researcher, etc.), so long as their compliance with the
ABS laws is proven. If it is enforceable, such an
approach would constitute an incentive to good cor-
porate citizenship and compliance with ABS around
the world.
Another potential incentive would apply where
the source country created streamlined access proce-
dures for users who take certain actions (including
potentially the certificate, certification or voluntary
codes, as described above).198 The possibilities for such
simplification are as diverse as the national circum-
stances. For instance, in Mexico, some national
experts agree that having the State involved in all ABS
activities might create excessive inefficiency in ABS
management.199 Thus, an element of the expedited
procedure could include an exemption, under which
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194 Glowka, 2001.
195 The BioTrade Initiative is looking for the development of a verification system for the natural ingredients sector. See BioTrade Facilitation
Programme, Framework for the verification of BioTrade companies of natural ingredients, Working Document, Geneva, March 2006.
196 The need for guidance and orientation is evidenced by the guidelines and principles, in either final or draft form, developed by biotechnologi-
cal organizations in the USA, Europe and Japan (in the latter case, in conjunction with the Japanese Trade Ministry). 
197 This book does not consider the legal implications of this kind of action, the listing and delisting process, and the potential for harm to inno-
cent companies that are mistakenly removed from the list, even if only for a short time.
198 A somewhat similar measure was suggested at the First Panel of the Experts of the CBD. However, it focused on the conduct of persons, not
State acts, it only referred to voluntary instruments, and it only suggested simplifying the PIC procedures. See Report of the Panel of Experts,
op. cit., Annex V. 
199 Larson et al., 2004. 
The first step in ensuring the CBD ABS principles can
only be realized if Countries of Origin recognize their
rights, powers and responsibilities, and clearly impose
requirements on users through their own laws. Although
only countries that are predominantly source countries
have adopted ABS laws (giving them a strong position as
compared with developed/user countries), the fact
remains that fewer than 20 countries have adopted any
functional or partly functional ABS regulatory provisions.
Clearly the problems inherent in ABS (defini-
tions of genetic resources, problems of transboundary
oversight) have prevented many countries from act-
ing;201 however, it is not advisable for countries to sim-
ply wait for some external legislation to solve their
problems. Despite the legislative problems, users con-
the State's involvement in some activities might be
limited. (For example, where a series of Access events
are planned, it may not be necessary for the State to
be party to every single access agreement.)200
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200 Allegedly, agreements are most likely to succeed when the number of parties is minimized. Particularly, some experts claim that having the State
directly involved in the negotiation of benefit-sharing agreements results in bureaucratic hurdles that lead to inefficacies and high transaction
costs, Larson et al., 2004. 
201 Alternatively, many countries that have no ABS legislation in place might choose to wait for the outcome of the negotiations. Something simi-
lar happened regarding the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, where controls were delayed pending completion of the negotiations, providing an
opportunity for many companies which strongly requested that they be given permission to introduce their products before any new laws are
adopted. Young, “Access and Benefit sharing: In Search of an ‘International Regime,’ ” Environmental Law Programme Newsletter, IUCN,
Bonn, 2004.
4.3.1 Role of incentives in source-country legislation
For the source country, the most important question
about measures such as guidelines and certification is
how they should be applied legislatively. This raises a
number of questions, including the following:
• How would the source country's access legisla-
tion incorporate these measures?
• Can national law give preference to users that
commit to the standards of an "ABS Certification
System" or specified/approved voluntary codes of
conduct? 
• What corresponding measures could the source
country adopt, in the case of a code of conduct
like the Japanese Guidelines described above,
where the user country has made specific com-
mitments, to help avoid lawsuits or claims for
misappropriation or biopiracy?
• Can other steps be adopted to promote voluntary
systems that recognize, in the market, users that
have complied with ABS good practices? 
Specific issues can be noted with regard to the exam-
ples mentioned above. For example, the creation of a
"voluntary certification" system can be confusing,
when applied in source country legislation. In essence,
such a system will not guarantee that anyone will com-
ply with ABS legislation, although it may create an
incentive for some users to comply. At the same time, if
the source country declares that certification will be
mandatory for all users of the country's genetic
resources, they may face problems under many other
legal regimes (trade, contractual, enforcement, etc.) as
well as objections from countries whose participation in
the certification system was conditioned on the fact that
it was "voluntary."
If the certification system is functional however
(that is, if the system has found a mechanism that is
highly effective and leakproof for confirming that the
user has complied with the system standards, and for
tracking products and controlling labeling), then the
source country may be able to create a different incen-
tive based on the certification system. Specifically, it
can provide special streamlined procedures and other
special arrangements for any applicant who is certified
under the system, and who agrees that his actions will
comply with that system. 
4.3.2 Recommendations regarding monitoring and oversight 
One step that source countries can consider, as a
means of finding an appropriate standard of flexibili-
ty in addressing post-access monitoring and oversight,
is through the concept of reciprocality. By nature,
however, reciprocality is a "double-edged sword,"
since a reciprocality provision may require the user
countries to provide only the level of oversight and
protection that the source country provides. This
might possibly mean that reciprocality would require
source countries to adopt detailed and comprehensive
tinue to obtain, research and utilize genetic resources
on a regular basis. Unless those uses are bound by
appropriate laws and contractual provisions requiring
necessary actions at the source country level, those
transactions may well be "lost to remedy" in the event
that user measures or international provisions are later
adopted. However, if properly written, these docu-
ments may provide some interim protection, as well as
a basis for oversight and monitoring by new mecha-
nisms, at that time. 
These time concerns are not uncommon and are
shared by other international agreements including,
most relevantly, the International Treaty on Plant
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA),
and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Although
there is strong national interest in both instruments,
national implementation has either not started or has
not been significant yet. Clearly, even if the interna-
tional negotiations could be expected to completely
replace the need for national legislation, it is not
appropriate simply to wait for that day.
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202 See, for example, the Bonn Guidelines and the documents that were provided during their negotiation.
203 Dross and Wolff, 2005. 
204 Hodges and Daniel, 2005.
4.4 Additional concerns: flexibility and law
In ABS discussions at all levels, one common com-
plaint voiced by user companies is the fact that ABS
regulations are very difficult to comply with, and that
different situations require special treatment, in part
because, as discussed above, there are many areas in
which ABS law is unclear, unreliable or undeveloped.
Normally, however, law is perceived as firmly fixed -
because it must give certainty to all different categories
of individuals who are governed by or who rely on the
law, and also provide a basis for non-biased govern-
mental action. Increasingly, however, a need to pro-
vide some level of flexibility is asserted. This is a prob-
lem, given that the values of legal certainty and non-
biased application continue to apply. 
This tension is very apparent in the history of the
genetic resources issue. After the CBD created the
concept of a property right called "genetic resources"
and recognized it as (i) having value (see CBD Article
1), and (ii) being a sovereign right of the source coun-
try (CBD Article 15.1), there was an initial rush
among countries to establish highly restrictive regimes.
Thereafter, although pressures for flexibility and
streamlining are strongly asserted,202 concerns about
legal certainty for the source country have tempered
most subsequent legislative development. The Bonn
Guidelines address these issues through a series of pro-
visions which are entirely voluntary. If this "volun-
tary" nature means that no applicant may be required
to comply, this would mean that the Guidelines are
completely flexible, but also completely uncertain. It
also does nothing to aid governments in their goal of
ensuring that the ABS system gives fair treatment to
all users (and providers).  However, the Bonn
Guidelines focus primarily on access issues, and do
not address the serious governance problems described
in Chapter 2,203 especially the need for enforcement
and oversight of resource utilization outside the source
country. 204
4.5 Flexibility through governmental reciprocality 
oversight mechanisms, and then pray that none of
their citizens decide to utilize any other country's
genetic resources, triggering costly implementation. 
However, a second option, without requiring
mirroring, might be possible. A source country might
consider adopting legislation under which special
ABS procedures are only available for users operating
under the jurisdiction of a country that has adopted
certain measures. This approach might eliminate a
common problem where applications had been
refused, because the authorities felt that they did not
have adequate guarantees or were uncertain of how
exported material might really be used. 
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4.6 Case study: reciprocality in the Seychelles' draft ABS Law 
The Seychelles constitutes a good example of a country
for which oversight and control of users will be nearly
impossible. The Seychelles is not primarily a "user" of
genetic resources, and will probably not be able to
build the level of infrastructure to monitor, test, or
take other actions that impose restrictions on users. Its
draft law, however, attempts to remedy these deficiencies,
through the use of two kinds of provisions, legal 
mandates (basic user measures) and reciprocity. These
provisions were included to give users and user countries
an idea of the minimum that is expected from other
countries in return for access and the right to use
genetic resources.  
These user provisions are very basic statements,
however. In general, they simply require Seychellois
who are utilizing the genetic resources of other coun-
tries to: 
• Comply with the laws of the source country
(Article 32);
• Comply with the terms and conditions of any
relevant permit or contract (Article 33); and
• Notify the source country when the resources
have been accessed (Article 34).
So long as these activities are required under the
source country law, it is probable that they would
already be required under general laws in the
Seychelles, however, this reaffirmation provides a
demonstration of the drafters' view of the minimum
that source countries should expect. 
For the purposes of access legislation, however, a
much more important provision is that which address-
es questions of legal reciprocity and unconscionable
terms and conditions. In this connection, Article 36 of
the draft law states that: 
The provisions of this Part shall only apply in respect
of the laws or other terms and conditions of access or
utilization of foreign jurisdictions providing equiva-
lent or reciprocal protections to those contained in
this Part, and shall not be enforceable where any
relevant terms and conditions are declared uncons-
cionable.
Both clauses of this provision are of interest legally.
First, the reciprocity clause appears designed to create
an incentive for user countries to adopt "user meas-
ures." In essence, it says that "if you don't protect our
genetic resources from unauthorized exploitation, we
won't do the same for you." Presuming that other
source countries (with larger genetic-resource industry
and research bases) follow this example, such an incen-
tive might indeed develop. At the same time, that
clause suggests that all that user countries must do is
provide three or four unenforceable single sentence
mandates, in order to meet their responsibility under
Article 15.7.
In addition, the second clause might be interpret-
ed to be an authority to declare foreign law invalid -
another provision that might have negative reciprocal
impacts, if a user country were to adopt and enforce it. 
In modern legislative practice, any provision that lim-
its commercial relationships across national bound-
aries should consider the possibility of trade-related
concerns. Generally, a provision that does not restrict
trade (that is, importation of commercial goods and
services), but only places limits on foreign persons
who want to buy a country's resources does not run
afoul of the international trade regime (for practical
reasons relating to each country's own interest in the
sovereign/personal power to decide whether to sell and
to whom).206 However, it is useful to briefly consider
the possibility that a special privilege for some buyers
could raise trade concerns.  
This need is underscored, for example, by recent
political negotiations in Mexico. The idea of introduc-
ing, in addition to the standard access procedure, cer-
tain expedited/simplified access procedures for nation-
als of jurisdiction where user measures have been
adopted, was discussed within the environmental pub-
lic sector in Mexico, during the deliberation of the
Draft National ABS Law.207 In the end the Ministry of
Environment was not persuaded due to misunder-
standings over the exact limitations posed by interna-
In provisions of this type, however, it is important to
have something more than a promise or expectation
of compliance. Relatively few countries are able to
demand and receive guarantees or security that can
reliably protect their interest during the pendancy of
the ABS agreement.205 Effective global governance of
ABS, however, will clearly be dependent upon the
adoption and implementation of relevant law and
policy by national governments. 
Ultimately, this issue will have to be supported
by international action that provides source countries
with reliable bases for monitoring, evaluation, deter-
mining where there is "complete non-compliance"
(i.e., users who have not complied with ABS in any
way), and taking action to promote compliance. In
the meantime, reciprocity may be a useful first step.
One of the primary advantages of this kind of simplic-
ity is that it can be accepted by courts in user coun-
tries relatively quickly. If that happens it will enable
source countries to build confidence in the overall sys-
tem. Over time, as legislative reciprocity provisions
become common and are proven to work, many of
the more stringent and immovable source country
provisions will be dispensed with. In essence, recipro-
cality would transform the implementation of the
regime into a dynamic system where access would be
further facilitated through a legal evolution.
Obviously, such a provision should not overrule the
authority to determine access. 
Traditionally, it has been held that there is little
provider countries can do to influence compliance
outside their jurisdiction. The use of reciprocity meas-
ures may challenge this assumption. 
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205 See Lettington and Dogley, 2006.
206 The often misunderstood relationship between the rules of the WTO (World Trade Organization) and MEAs has been on the international
agenda for more than a decade. It arose out of a fear in the environmental policy community that the reasoning of a GATT (General Agreement
on Trade and Tariffs) panel, in the infamous Tuna-Dolphin case (1991), threatened the rapidly developing international architecture of envi-
ronmental protection. However, despite a considerable amount of attention in official intergovernmental processes – including, inter alia, the
World Trade Organization, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development and the World Summit on Sustainable Development – the debate about the appropriate parameters of this relationship persists
without resolution. Cfr Tarasofsky, 2004. There has been no indication, however, that it will impose a duty to sell natural sovereign resources
against national desires or interests.
207 C. López (one co-author of this book) led the legal position for the National Commission on Biodiversity, which regularly provides technical
advice to the Ministry of Environment. The position of the Commission was coordinated with the National Institute of Ecology (through José
Carlos Fernández). This coordination led to the common conclusion that there was a need to develop much simpler procedures that the ones
being advanced in the Draft Law, which later derived in the proposed measure.
4.7 Enforcement and guarantee
4.8 Trade concerns
tional trade obligations and an over-dimensioning of
the issue of discrimination. 
Probably the most important trade provisions for
ABS purposes are contained in the ITPGRFA, which
establishes in Article 11 that:
11.3 Contracting Parties also agree to take
appropriate measures to encourage natural and legal
persons within their jurisdiction who hold plant
genetic resources for food and agriculture listed in
Annex I to include such plant genetic resources for
food and agriculture in the Multilateral System.
11.4 Within two years of the entry into force
of the Treaty,208 the Governing Body shall assess the
progress in including the plant genetic resources for
food and agriculture referred to in paragraph 11.3
in the Multilateral System. Following this assess-
ment, the Governing Body shall decide whether
access shall continue to be facilitated to those natural
and legal persons referred to in paragraph 11.3 that
have not included these plant genetic resources for
food and agriculture in the Multilateral System, or
take such other measures as it deems appropriate.
These provisions essentially threaten to impose a mul-
tilateral system if national efforts to increase access to
ITPGRFA listed species are not sufficient. In effect,
this is a reverse trade sanction, requiring countries to
give access, even if this is not possible or desirable
from their point of view. 
A significant amount of interpretation will be
required from the Governing Body since many
aspects of the functioning of this mechanism are still
unclear.209 Thus a full comparative analysis cannot be
concluded at this point. 
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208 The Treaty came into force on 29 June 2004. Therefore, the review should take place before 29 June 2006 in theory. However, so far, this aspect
has not been addressed. 
209 For instance, it is not clear whether it is the State conduct or the private individual conduct what is subject to the review. Traditionally, only States
acquire directly rights and obligations in international treaties. However, many recent treaties, including the ITPGRFA in other provisions, tran-
scend and affect rights and obligations within the private sphere of individuals.
Inevitably, although this book is intended to address
national implementation rather than simply adding
another to the huge volume of expert opinions on what
should be done in the international regime negotiations,
in the end our conclusions necessarily focus on some
issues which appear to be resolvable only through those
negotiations.
National ABS legal systems need to restate some
conceptual basic aspects to be consistent and function-
al. The lack of reflection on the scope of certain con-
cepts or on the need to consider the effectiveness of
applying the contract and property rights law, conse-
quently hinder the implementation of ABS systems. To
date, the studies on this matter are scarce, as are the leg-
islative attempts to tackle these conceptual aspects.
Among the conceptual elements to be studied, those of
genetic resources, derivatives, biological resources and
utilization stand out. One key conclusion is the need for
an integrated approach to these concepts and a recon-
sideration of the use of conventional mechanisms (prop-
erty, contracts) to put into effect ABS regimes. 
Although these topics must be dealt with at a
national level, it is necessary to give legal consistency to
the ABS systems, international understandings in these
matters, in order to support the national efforts. In this
sense, the negotiations of the IR are a framework to
resolve and to find solutions to some of these problems.
It should be indicated that although resolving these
aspects is critical, for the operation of a system of ABS,
there exist other operative basic problems that are equal-
ly important. Among them: the capacity to negotiate;
political will; and the lack of confidence between differ-
ent stakeholders.
Despite the lack of understanding of some basic
topics, some countries have started implementing their
national laws. This demonstrates that national measures
need to be strengthened.
The efforts of provider countries will probably
continue to reflect the insufficiency of unilateral nation-
al legislation to regulate ABS, until countries have
adopted user measures under which they commit to
require and promote their own companies and ex-situ
collections to engage in benefit sharing with source
countries, and apply those provisions, including access
to justice, in the cases of non-compliance of contracts or 
illegal access.
Clear criteria should be established with regard to
the differences between access for basic research and for
commercial purposes. 
With regard to property rights over genetic
resources it is necessary that these are addressed at the
national level and, at the same time, that the difficulties
to apply traditional concepts of control and exclusion in
the case of the genetic information contained in the
samples are recognized. The clarification of the implica-
tions of the public domain concept in relation to the
rights granted to the bioprospector is also a key aspect to
provide legal certainty.
Providing countries should establish clear, simple
and transparent systems of ABS, including those relative
to the PIC. Any flexibility in the ABS process can be
conditioned to the existence of user measures which
would be compatible with the international trade sys-
tem.
The incentives which provider countries can rea-
sonably give to encourage compliance, such as faster
approval procedures, reduced application fees and spe-
cial status for those who demonstrate compliance with
ABS regimes, must be explored.
Finally, although legal studies and analyses are nec-
essary for this to happen, we feel that the most impor-
tant objective is that the result should focus on practical
solutions that offer legal certainty while protect the
rights of the providers.
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